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ABSTRACT
U NDER THE FEDERAL Aviation Administration (FAA) reg-ulations, no commercial airplane with fewer than three en-
gines may fly a route that at any point exceeds 60 minutes flying
time from a suitable airport. The industry calls this "the 60-min-
ute rule." ETOPS is the exception to that rule. By satisfying strin-
gent ETOPS requirements, an airline may fly two-engine planes
on "extended operation" routes that exceed 60 minutes. ETOPS
has enormously influenced the aviation industry. This article
traces the history of ETOPS, including its creation and the
evolution known as "early ETOPS." In doing so, the article iden-
tifies factors contributing to ETOPS's success. This article then
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evaluates these factors in light of the nearly unprecedented
grounding of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner following two serious
battery failures. The author argues that the difficulties of the
Boeing 787 warrant the application of ETOPS-like principles to
the adoption of novel technology, such as lithium-ion batteries,
for aviation.
INTRODUCTION
"ETOPS [is] bureaucratese for extended-range twin-engine operations
... [but] some in the industry say the initials really stand for 'engines
turn or passengers swim.
- John Holusha
A. To PRECLUDE AND PROTECT
Two commercial airline passenger flights, separated by nearly
two decades, illustrate ETOPS.2 On February 1, 1985, Trans
World Airlines (TWA) Flight 810 departed Boston bound for
Paris.' The Boeing 767 aircraft flew northeast toward Green-
land, then turned southeast toward Ireland.' As the aircraft ap-
proached the Irish coast, in range of London radio
communications, the pilots identified their flight to London
ground control.5 Over the open radio, another airborne pilot
I John Holusha, Pushing the Envelope at Boeing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1991, at 31.
2 ETOPS has had several definitions. See 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2013). The term
"ETOPS" was first used by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
to mean "extended-range twin-engine operational performance standards." FAQ:
ETOPS, GREAT CIRCLE MAPPER, http://www.gcmap.com/faq/etops (last visited
June 26, 2013). At that time, the FAA used the term EROPS, meaning "extended
range operations" (for simplicity, this article only uses the term ETOPS). See
ETPOS Training Course, AVIATIONLEARNING.NET 1, http://aviationlearning.net/
files/ETOPSintroduction.pdf (last visited June 26, 2013). The FAA later defined
ETOPS as "extended-range operations with two-engine airplanes"; under current
FAA regulations, ETOPS is defined as "extended operations." See Extended Oper-
ations (ETPOS) of Multi-Engine Airplanes, 72 Fed. Reg. 1,808, 1,813 (Jan. 16,
2007) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 1, 21, 25, 33, 121 & 135). ETOPS also has
several sardonic definitions. EROPS has sometimes been called "engines run or
passengers swim" or "engines run or pilots swim"; ETOPS similarly has been re-
ferred to as "Engines Turn or Passengers Swim." See Holusha, supra note 1, at 31;
Instant EROPS: Selling Point or Safety Issue?, FLIGHT INT'L, July 25-31, 1990, at
24-25. In titling this article with the phrase "Engines Turn or Passengers Swim,"
the author does not mean to suggest that ETOPS should be looked at sarcastically
or skeptically.
3 SeeJames Ott, Boeing 767 North Atlantic Rights Reshape Trans World Planning,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 11, 1985, at 31.
4 See id.
5 Id.
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with a British accent quipped, 'You're very lucky to have made
it. "6 Another inquired, "Are they still both running?"7 Six hours
and thirty-two minutes after takeoff, Flight 810 landed safely in
Paris."
Eighteen years later, on March 17, 2003, United Airlines
Flight 842 departed Auckland, New Zealand, bound for Los An-
geles.' The Boeing 777 flew north over the Pacific Ocean.o
While most of the passengers slept, the crew received a low-oil-
quantity alert from one of the two Pratt & Whitney engines, fol-
lowed by a high-oil-temperature alert.' The crew throttled the
troubled engine back to idle. 1 2 When the oil temperature con-
tinued to rise, the crew shut down the engine-leaving the 777
(one of the largest passenger aircraft) flying on a single
engine."
Flight 842 was three hours flying time from the nearest air-
port, Honolulu." But after evaluating weather conditions in
Honolulu, the crew chose to divert to Kona, Hawaii.1 5 For 177
minutes, Flight 842 flew against headwinds on a single engine."6
At the top of the descent into Kona, the crew informed passen-
gers of the situation, and shortly thereafter Flight 842 landed
safely." A failed No. 3 bearing in the right engine had caused
the engine loss."
Flights 810 and 842 illustrate the two objectives of ETOPS:
preclude and protect. ETOPS is a set of regulations designed to
preclude failures or malfunctions that could cause a flight to




9 SeeJames Ott, Record Diversion, AvIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 24, 2003, at
44.
10 Accidents and Incidents, AIR SAFEX WK., Mar. 24, 2003, at 7.
11 Divert Details, AIR SAFETY WK., Mar. 24, 2003, at 10; Ott, Record Diversion, supra
note 9, at 44.
12 Divert Details, supra note 11, at 10.
13 See id.
14 Id. at 9.
15 Id. at 10.
16 Still Tops for ETOPS, AIR SAFEty WK., Apr. 14, 2003, at 8.
'7 Divert Details, supra note 11, at 10.
18 Id.
19 Special Conditions: Extended Range Operations of Boeing Model 777 Series
Airplanes, 59 Fed. Reg. 28,234, 28,236 (June 1, 1994) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt.
25).
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necessary, ETOPS regulations are designed to protect the air-
plane and occupants during the diversion.2 0
ETOPS governs "extended operation" flights by two-engine
commercial airplanes. 2 1 ETOPS is an exception to the rule bar-
ring twin-engine passenger planes from flying routes that ex-
ceed 60 minutes flying time from a suitable airport.22 Airplanes
and airlines that satisfy stringent ETOPS requirements may fly
routes that exceed 60 minutes from an airport, up to a specified
limit.23
TWA Flight 810 from Boston to Paris was the first revenue
flight operated under ETOPS rules.2 4 It flew a route that at its
farthest point reached 75 minutes from the nearest suitable air-
port.2 5 This allowed for a slightly more direct route to Paris, sav-
ing a modest seventy-six nautical miles from the journey.
To qualify for the ETOPS flight, the twin-engine 767-200 had
been specially modified to enhance safety, reliability, and redun-
dancy.27 TWA and Boeing had worked closely with the FAA to
develop flight operations for long-range missions with the twin-
engine aircraft.28 During the flight, eleven FAA representatives
were on board watching the readings of the Engine-Indicating
and Crew-Alerting System (EICAS) that monitored the two Pratt
& Whitney JT9D-7R4D engines.2 9 With the push of a button, the
76 7 's computer was programmed to redirect the aircraft to an
alternate airport at the first sign of trouble.o The 767 was also
equipped with a data-link to provide real-time engine perform-
ance monitoring on the ground.1
As the first commercial ETOPS flight, Flight 810 was an enor-
mous leap forward in commercial aviation, but the general pub-
lic was largely unaware of this milestone. To the passengers of
20 Id.
21 As of 2007, many ETOPS requirements apply to the extended operation
flights of three- and four-engine planes. 14 C.F.R. §§ 25.1535, 121.161 (2013).
22 See id. § 121.161 (after 2007, for three- and four-engine planes, the thresh-
old is 180 minutes).
23 See id. § 25.2535.




28 See id.; John M. Swihart, High-Tech Engines Outgrow "60-Minute Twin Rule",
AEROSPACE AM., Jan. 1985, at 14.
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Flight 810, the event was hardly noteworthy. When the crew an-
nounced the historic nature of the flight, it was news to most
passengers." A student traveling with a group of classmates
wrote on a commemorative postcard, "Now they tell me it's a
two-engine airplane, as if I didn't have enough troubles."" A
first-class passenger from France was awoken by the announce-
ment and asked what was said; when told, he shrugged and fell
back asleep."
Eighteen years later, United Flight 842 demonstrated the
other ETOPS objective: protection. The Boeing 777 had been
designed from inception to fly ETOPS routes." When the Pratt
& Whitney engine malfunctioned, an electronic caution alert
module message notified the pilots so they could idle and shut
down the engine to avoid further damage. When the crew was
forced to shut down an engine, the remaining engine had suffi-
cient reserve power to fly the 777 for the duration of the flight.3 7
The 777 was also designed with sufficient redundant power
sources to ensure that all critical flight systems could be pow-
ered, even with only a single engine keeping the plane aloft.,
Flight 842 demonstrated that ETOPS could protect a plane and
its passengers even if an engine failed in the middle of the Pa-
cific Ocean.
B. ETOPS AS A CASE STUDY
Why study ETOPS? ETOPS, though largely obscure to the
public, has enormously impacted aviation. Millions of ETOPS
flights have been flown to date.3 9 The economic impact of
ETOPS measures in the billions: ETOPS has directly influenced
the design of planes that manufacturers build, which planes air-
lines decide to purchase, and the routes that planes fly.4 0




Boeing Commercial Airplane Corp., ETOPS Maintenance of Non-ETOPS
Airplanes, AERO, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_07/
etops.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
36 See Divert Details, supra note 11.
3 See id.
38 See id.
3 See BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES, ETOPS EXPLAINED: AN OVERVIEW OF Ex-
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more-fuel-efficient and less-costly-to-operate aircraft.4 1 Most no-
tably, ETOPS has improved the safety of commercial aviation:
no ETOPS flight has been lost because of a danger that ETOPS
was meant to address. 2 And the enhanced maintenance re-
quirements and reliability improvements have made their way to
non-ETOPS flights, further increasing safety in commercial avia-
tion.4 The unqualified success of ETOPS makes it somewhat of
an exception in the scheme of large regulatory regimes.
Yet the flying public is largely oblivious to ETOPS.4 4 Passen-
gers may only briefly notice the cryptic acronym stenciled on a
plane's landing-gear cover. Or passengers may experience the
consequences of ETOPS-for example, Alaska Airlines (an ex-
clusive twin-engine 737 operator) offers flights to Hawaii.4 ' But,
ultimately, far more passengers benefit from ETOPS than know
it exists.
Thus, the scope, impact, and success of ETOPS are a fertile
topic of study. Indeed, little is available on the history of ETOPS.
Few books and articles covering the aviation industry devote
41 See id. at Intro-2.
42 See id. at Intro-3. Some may debate this point. In 2009, Air France Flight 447,
a twin-engine ETOPS Airbus A330, crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, killing all
228 passengers and crew. See Pierre Sparaco, Collateral Damages, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Aug. 15, 2011, at 29. The crash was attributed to a pitot tube failure
and pilot error. See id. In 2008, British Airways Flight 38, a twin-engine Boeing
777, crashed just short of the runway, with no fatalities. See Airliner Crash-Lands at
Heathrow, BBC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/en-
gland/london/7194086.stm. The crash was attributed to a clogged fuel/oil heat
exchanger. Chad Trautvetter, Ice in Fuel System Caused 777 Crash, AINONLINE (Feb.
17, 2010), http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/aviation-international-
news/2010-02-17/ice-fuel-system-caused-777-crash. In 1999, EgyptAir Flight 990, a
twin-engine Boeing 767, crashed in the Atlantic Ocean. NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY
BD., AIRCRAFr ACCIDENT BRIEF: EGYPTAIR FLIGHT 990, at 1 (1999). The NTSB de-
termined the probable cause was that the first officer intentionally crashed the
plane. Id. at 5, 41. Finally, in 2013, Asiana Airlines Flight 214, a 777, crash-landed
at San Francisco International Airport, killing three passengers and injuring
many more. Matthew L. Wald, In Asiana Crash Investigation, Early Focus Is on the
Crew's Actions, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/
us/in-asiana-crash-investigation-early-focus-is-on-the-crews-actions.html? r=0. '
Though the investigation is ongoing, pilot error is presumed. Id. Given that pilot
error is not addressed by ETOPS and that the 777 crashes occurred during land-
ing-a non-ETOPS portion of the flight-it is the author's opinion that no
ETOPS flight has been lost because of a danger that ETOPS was meant to
address.
43 See BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES, supra note 39, at Intro-4.
44 See Ott, Boeing 767 North Atlantic Flights, supra note 3, at 31.
45 See Alaska Airlines 737-200, WORLD AIR ROUTES, www.worldairroutes.com/
Alaska.html (last visited July 15, 2013).
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more than a page or two to ETOPS. The one notable exception
is Mohan Pandey's fascinating book, How Boeing Defied the Airbus
Challenge, which provides a detailed account of ETOPS's later
evolutions, including "early ETOPS" and the 2007 ETOPS
rule. 6 Indeed, this article draws heavily from Pandey's book in
the section on early ETOPS. This article attempts to pull to-
gether a detailed early history of ETOPS in the hope that this
will enable a better understanding of what has made ETOPS a
success.
Additionally, a recent event has given further relevance to the
study of ETOPS-the nearly unprecedented grounding of the
Boeing 787 Dreamliner. In early January 2013, the Boeing 787,
Boeing's first non-derivative "clean-sheet" design since the 777,
suffered two serious battery failures: one on the ground during a
routine post-flight inspection, and one during a domestic flight
in Japan.4 7 These failures prompted the FAA and other interna-
tional regulators to ground the 787, making it the first airplane
model grounded since the McDonnell Douglas DC-10 in 1979.48
The problems and subsequent grounding of the 787 have raised
a host of questions regarding the 787's design, manufacturing,
certification, and operation. Tracing the history of ETOPS af-
fords an opportunity to address the 787's problems because, like
the Boeing 777, the 787 was designed from the ground up for
ETOPS flights. 49
Thus, this case study addresses two questions: why was ETOPS
a success, and does the answer shed light on the 787 grounding?
To that end, this article begins by tracing the history of the re-
strictions on two-engine airplanes. It then turns to the initial de-
velopment of 120-minute and 180-minute ETOPS. The article
then covers the development of the Boeing 777, the implemen-
tation of early ETOPS, and more recent ETOPS developments.
It then discusses some of the factors that contributed to
ETOPS's success. From there, this article covers the difficulties
of the Boeing 787 and applies the factors of success to the 787 to
argue for the adoption of ETOPS-like principles when imple-
menting novel aviation technology.
46 See MOHAN PANDEY, How BOEING DEFIED THE AIRBUS CHALLENGE: AN IN-
SIDER'S AccoUNT 53-54 (2010).
47 Boeing 787 Suffers a Battery Fire in Boston, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2013, at B5.
48 Alan Levin & Susanna Ray, FAA Studying Bad Batteries as Possible Cause of 787
Fault, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 17, 2013, 4:40 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2013-01-17/faa-studying-bad-batteries-as-possible-cause-of-787-fault.html.
49 BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES, supra note 39, at Intro-2.
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I. EARLY RESTRICTIONS ON TWO- AND THREE-ENGINE
PASSENGER AIRCRAFT
A. EARLY FEDERAL REGULATION OF AVIATION
One of the earliest federal regulations of aviation concerned
ensuring that a plane could safely reach an airport in an emer-
gency. The Air Commerce Act of 1926 gave the Department of
Commerce responsibility for regulating flight with the aim of
winning public confidence by establishing standards of safe air
travel.50 One aim of the Act was to ensure availability of ade-
quate airports close enough "together to insure gliding to
safety."5
In 1935, the Bureau of Air Commerce restricted night flights
over rough terrain to planes with multiple engines that were ca-
pable of flying on a single engine.5 2 Starting in 1936, airlines
operating twin-engine piston airplanes were required to show
that intermediate fields for landing were located at least every
100 miles along the proposed route.53 By 1945, two- and three-
engine airplanes were restricted to routes that did not exceed 45
minutes flying time from an adequate airport at normal cruising
speeds.54
The restriction on two- and three-engine aircraft was a logical
consequence of the unreliability of piston engines. In 1952, air-
craft piston engines failed on average once every 4,000 flight
hours.55 A double failure (loss of two engines) occurred on aver-
age once every 8,000,000 flight hours." Thus, a 200-plane fleet
that operates each plane for 2,500 hours a year could expect a
double failure every sixteen years.5,
50 See Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568
(1926).
51 See S. REP. No. 57-460, at 19 (1922).
52 DONALD R. WHITNAH, SAFER SKYWAYS: FEDERAL CONTROL OF AVIATION,
1926-1966 93 (1966).
53 FAA, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR 120-42A: EXTENDED RANGE
OPERATION WITH TWo-ENGINE AIRPLANES (ETOPS) 4 (1988) [hereinafter ADvi-
SORY CIRCULAR 120-42A].
54 See RICHARD W. TAYLOR, BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE Co., EXTENDED
RANGE OPERATION OF TWIN-ENGINE COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES 3 fig. 4 (1985); 15
Fed. Reg. 6,708, 6,708 (Oct. 5, 1950).
55 Swihart, supra note 28, at 14.
56 Id.; RICHARD W. TAYLOR, BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE CO., WORLDWIDE OP-
ERATION OF TWIN-JET AIRCRAFT (PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE) 17 (1983).
57 Swihart, supra note 28, at 14; TAYLOR, WORLDWIDE OPERATION, supra note 56,
at 17.
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Anecdotally, the reliability of the Boeing four-engine
Stratocruiser earned it the nickname "the Boeing trimotor" be-
cause of its frequent engine failures." And on one round-trip
North Atlantic flight, a Lockheed Constellation suffered five en-
gine failures. 9 One former Constellation pilot recalled suffering
an overspeed on the No. 2 engine, oil loss on the No. 3, and an
engine fire on the No. 4-all on the same takeoff. 0
Additionally, piston engine reliability decreased as the en-
gines grew more powerful."1 Engine horsepower and the fre-
quency of in-flight failures are directly correlated.12 Thus, a four-
engine piston airplane was safer than a comparable two-engine
airplane, not only because of the presence of redundant en-
gines, but also because the individual engines could be less pow-
erful and hence less likely to fail.63
In 1953, the FAA adopted the 60-minute rule, which is still
largely in effect today. 4 Section 40.62 of the Civil Air Regula-
tions (CARs) (later renamed FAR 121.161 and now codified at
14 C.F.R. § 121.161) prohibited airplanes with fewer than four
engines from flying more than 60 minutes beyond a suitable air-
port.65 Sixty minutes was defined as one-hour flying time at nor-
mal cruising speed with one engine inoperative. 6 The purpose
was to limit flying time after power loss in one engine of a two-
engine airplane.
The 60-minute rule was intended to bar two-engine propeller
airplanes, such as the Douglas DC-3, from flying extended
routes that were more safely served by four-engine propeller air-
craft.6' The rule generally prevented two- and three-engine
planes from flying long-range routes and ocean routes. But as a
practical matter, two-engine airplanes lacked the range for such
58 TAYLOR, WORLDWIDE OPERATION, supra note 56, at 8.
59 Id.
60 TWA Expects Solid ETOPS Record Will Ease Transition to A330, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Apr. 13, 1992, at 49.
61 BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES, supra note 39, at 1-4.
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 Though as of 2007, the 180-minute rule also applies to three- and four-en-
gine planes.
65 Additionally, the rule now restricts three- and four-engine planes from flying
routes that exceed 180 minutes of diversion time. FAA, Civil Air Regulations
§ 40.62(a) (1964); see 14 C.F.R. § 121.161(d) (1965).
66 FAA, Civil Air Regulations § 40.62(a).
67 Advisory Circular; Extended Range Operations with Two-Engine Airplanes,
50 Fed. Reg. 5,150, 5,150 (Feb. 6, 1985).
68 BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES, supra note 39, at 1-3.
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trips.69 Thus, the 60-minute rule did not generally hinder their
performance.
Also in 1953, the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), a United Nations agency, published recommendations
for a 90-minute rule."o ICAO recommendations are advisory un-
less adopted as law by individual nations." The 90-minute rule
recommendation restricted airplanes from routes that strayed
more than 90 minutes from a landing area." Ninety minutes was
more leniently defined as the plane's cruising speed with all en-
gines operative.73 This difference made the 90-minute rule
roughly equivalent to double the FAA's 60-minute rule. Planes
meeting certain performance requirements with two engines in-
operative were exempted from the rule. This requirement
made exemption impossible for twin-engine planes.7' But the re-
quirement was commonly interpreted to allow twin-engine
planes to be operated under the 90-minute rule.7 7 In 1984, how-
ever, an ICAO representative wrote that twin-engine aircraft
were never contemplated when the 90-minute rule was being
developed.
69 Ken Romain, Air Canada Plans Overwater Use of 767s, GLOBE & MAIL, JUy 16,
1984, at 6.
70 AIRBUS, GETTING To GRIPS WITH ETOPS 10 (1998); GEORGE V. D'ANGELO,
AEROSPACE AGENCIES AND ORGANIZATIONS: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS AND GOVERN-
MENT 121 (1993) (The ICAO was formed in April 1947 after 26 states ratified the
Chicago Convention. It was tasked with developing the principles and techniques
of international air navigation and fostering the planning and development of
international air transport to ensure safe and orderly growth of civil aviation
throughout the world.).
71 Boeing Wants Overwater Twins, FLIGHT INT'L, Dec. 31, 1983, at 1709, available
at http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1983/1983%20-%202307.
html?search=overwater.
72 See AIRBUs, supra note 70, at 10.
7 See TAYLOR, WORLDWIDE OPERATION, supra note 56, at 4.
74 Id.
75 Extended Range Operations of Twin-Engined Commercial Air Transport Aeroplanes
2 (Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Working Paper No. AN-WP/5693, 1985) (on file with
author) [hereinafter ICAO Working Paper 5693].
76 Id.
77 EUR. AcAD. FOR AVIATION SAFETY, ETOPS BRIEFING SLIDE 14 (1999), available
at http://www.coscapsa.org/Operations/Courses/ETHIST98.PPT.
78 E. Sochor, Letter to the Editor, 60 Min-Rule Corrections, FLIGHT INT'L, June
16, 1984, at 1552 (written by the Chief Public Information Office, ICAO).
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B. THE INTRODUCTION OF JET TRANSPORTS SPURS THE FAA TO
MODIFY THE 60-MINUTE RULE
The introduction of passenger jetliners led to the first major
change to the 60-minute rule. On May 2, 1952, a year before the
60-minute rule's adoption, the first passenger jetliner, the De
Havilland Comet, entered service." But a series of crashes
(largely due to metal fatigue) slowed adoption of the Comet.80
Adoption of commercial jetliners did not gain significant mo-
mentum until the Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8 entered service
in 1958 and 1959, respectively. 8'
Pan-Am Airlines ordered the first commercial 707s in 1955.
Three years later, Pan-Am received its first 707 and began flights
between New York and Paris.8 1 Pan-Am and Boeing jointly mar-
keted the 707, emphasizing its speed: "Only seven hours to
brush up on your French."8 4 By 1960, more passengers crossed
the Atlantic by plane than by boat.85
Because jetliners flew higher and faster than piston aircraft,
some predicted that accidents would increase. One expert took
the existing accident rate and assumed that air traffic would
continue to increase while the accident rate would remain the
same." He predicted "10,000 crash fatalities a year by the turn
of the century."87 Instead, the accident rate "declin [ed] in direct
proportion to the increase in jet flights."" There was one fatal
accident for every 150,000 flights during the first two years ofjet
travel.89
The improvement in safety derived largely from the fact that
jet turbine engines are significantly more reliable than piston
engines. 0 jet engines are fundamentally simpler machines with
79 BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES, supra note 39, at 3-3.
so See EUGENE RODGERS, FLYING HIGH: THE STORY OF BOEING AND THE RISE OF
THEJETLINER INDUSTRY 169-70 (1996); STEVEN McGUIRE, AIRBUS INDUSTRIE: CON-
FLICT AND COOPERATION IN US-EC TRADE RELATIONS 27 (1997).
81 See PANDEY, supra note 46, at 5-6.
82 Boeing Marks the 50th Anniversary of 707 First Flight, BOEING (Dec. 20, 2007),
http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2007/q4/071220d_nr.html.
83 See PANDEY, supra note 46, at 6.
- See id.
85 Id. at 7.




90 GEORGE BIBEL, BEYOND THE BLACK Box: THE FORENSICS OF AIRPLANE CRASHES
208 (2011).
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fewer moving parts." While piston engines pound, turbine corn-
ponents "rotate smoothly and continuously."9 2 Jet engines also
require less maintenance." "In 1958, the FAA required that tur-
bine engines be overhauled at least once every thousand
hours."9 4 By 1968, it was 8,000 hours. Jet engines are also sim-
pler for pilots to operate: pilots can increase power during a
rejected landing with a single motion on the throttle.96 For the
same power increase, a piston engine would require numerous
engine power adjustments. 7
Jet engines also provide the advantage of high-altitude flight.
While piston-engine aircraft typically cruise around 16,000
feet-directly through bad weather-jetliners cruise far above
bad weather." And, unlike piston engines, jet engine reliability
did not decrease as engines grew more powerful." The attrib-
utes of jet turbine engines directly resulted in safe flying.1oo
Following the introduction of the 707 and DC-8, airlines
wanted to expand jet service to short-to-medium routes and
wanted ajet more suitable for that role.101 Boeing launched the
727 to satisfy that demand. 0 2 Designing the 727 raised a difficult
question: how many engines should it have? Half the market
wanted a two-engine product (for lower operating costs), while
half wanted a four-engine aircraft (for better performance). 10
Federal regulations also affected the decision. The Civil Aero-
nautics Authority (CAA) required twin-engine planes to satisfy a
climb requirement with one engine inoperative.10 ' This meant
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. ("The Boeing 707, the first successful commercial jet[,] ... had over 100
fewer engine-related controls, instruments, and displays in the cockpit compared
to a similar piston plane.")
94 SERLING, supra note 86, at 154.
95 Id.
96 BIBEL, supra note 90, at 208-09.
97 Id. at 209.
98 See TAYLOR, WORLDWIDE OPERATION, supra note 56, at 10.
9 See id.
100 See id.
101 M.Y. Yoshina, Global Competition in a Salient Industry: The Case of Civil Aircraft,
in GLOBAL COMPETITION IN GLOBAL INDUSTRIEs 519 (Michael Porter ed., 1986).
102 Id.
103 William H. Gregory, Valedictory for the 727, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Feb. 28, 1983, at 11.
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that twin-engine aircraft needed very powerful engines ("partic-
ularly at high-elevation airports [such as] Denver")."o'
The CAA also prohibited twins from taking off in weather
with less than a 300-foot cloud ceiling and a mile of visibility
(four-engine planes were permitted to take off in weather with a
100-foot ceiling and a half-mile of visibility). 06 This rule dealt a
significant competitive disadvantage to airlines operating two-
engine planes. TWA's engineering vice president, Bob Rummel,
summarized, "The two-engine airplane will obviously have disad-
vantages against the four. The CAA is down on them."10 Boeing
seriously considered these restrictions:
[It] examined the weather in New York for a whole year, corre-
lated it against the 11,041 departures scheduled from New York
by a chosen airline at the exact times at which each flight was due
to leave, and determined the precise difference in schedule relia-
bility between a twin-engined 727 and a 727 with more than two
engines... . Boeing ascertained that, in this respect, three-engine
aircraft would be treated no worse than existing four-engine ma-
chines .... 108
Boeing eventually settled on a three-engine design, conclud-
ing that three engines could provide both low operating costs
and high performance."o' But this was not an easy sell. One po-
tential customer opined, "A three-engine airplane will never
make it. . . . You've got a dead horse unless it has four engines.
The 727's going to be nothing but an albatross."o Boeing mar-
keted the 727 by pointing to its engine reliability. The
probability of a DC-6 piston engine shutting down was 1 in 450;
the 707's jet engines' probability was 1 in 1,200; and the 727's
engines were expected to be 1 in 1,600.111 The probability of two
727 engines shutting down for independent causes was 1 in
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In 1960, vindicating the decision to include only three en-
gines, the FAA's" 3 Chief of the Air Carrier Operations Branch
issued a letter stating that "a three-engine airplane with 727
characteristics would be considered to be in the same category
as a four-engine plane from the standpoint of weather mini-
mums allowed for takeoff."" This greatly improved the market-
ability of the 727.
The Boeing 727 tri-jet entered service with Eastern Air Lines
on February 1, 1964."5 By the end of production in 1984, 1,831
Boeing 727s had been sold and delivered."' The 727's entry
into service coincided with the first significant change to the 60-
minute rule. In 1963, the FAA proposed modifying the 60-min-
ute rule for three-engine jets.1 1 7 "It is quite possible," the FAA
wrote, "that the newly emerging three-engine jet airplanes, be-
cause of their overall performance and the general dependabil-
ity of turbine engines, should be considered in some instances
in the same category as four-engine airplanes insofar as the reg-
ulations are concerned.""" The FAA noted that two-engines-in-
operative flight is possible with three-engine airplanes, and the
loss of one engine does not result in single-engine operation.119
It proposed allowing three-engine aircraft to operate at dis-
tances equal to 90 minutes from an adequate airport in the
same manner permitted for four-engine airplanes.'2 0 Operation
distances greater than 90 minutes from such an airport were
permissible for three-engine airplanes that met the same two-
engines-inoperative climb requirements as required for four-en-
gine airplanes.'"' The FAA adopted the proposal, freeing the
727 to operate on unrestricted routes.
The 727's success inspired two aircraft manufacturers to de-
velop wide-body, three-engine passenger jets: the McDonnell-
Douglas DC-10 and the Lockheed L-1011. 1 2 2 The DC-10 entered
113 The FAA superseded the CAA in 1958. A BriefHistory of the FAA, FAA, http:/
/www.faa.gov/about/history/brief history/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
114 MANSFIELD, supra note 104, at 103.
115 Fast Facts: Boeing 727, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/news/feature/
sevenseries/727.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
116 SERLING, supra note 86, at 192.
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service in 1971 and the L-1011 in 1972.123 Compared to the four-
engine Boeing 747 (which entered service a year before the DC-
10), these two planes offered better operating economics and,
by carrying fewer passengers, they could serve routes that could
not be profitably operated by a 747 'jumbo jet."
C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LONG-RANGE TWIN-ENGINE JETS
As the first wide-body jets entered service, a new manufacturer
joined the market. In July 1967, the French, German, and Brit-
ish governments announced a joint venture to develop Airbus
Industries.' 2 4 Airbus formed in 1970 and shortly thereafter de-
veloped the A300, the world's first wide-body, twin-engine jet-
liner.1 2 1 Manufactured primarily in France, the A300 was first
sold to Air France, which received its first delivery in 1974. 126
The A300 filled a niche by offering seat capacity (267 seats
standard)127 and wide-body comfort similar to a DC-10. But with
only two engines, it offered better operating economics. And
when operated under jurisdictions adopting the ICAO's 90-min-
ute rule, the A300 was a versatile plane. In 1976, A300 operators
began flying across the North Atlantic, the Bay of Bengal, and
the Indian Ocean under the 90-minute rule.12 8
Airbus aggressively marketed the A300. Eastern Airlines' presi-
dent (and former Apollo 8 Astronaut), Frank Borman, report-
edly received such a good deal from Airbus that he told his staff,
"If you don't kiss the French flag every time you see it, at least
salute it."129 In mid-1977, Eastern Airlines, having agreed to
purchase several A300s, sought to loosen the FAA's 60-minute
rule to better utilize its A300s.so Borman requested that the 60-
minute rule be increased to at least 75 minutes, reminding the
FAA of the looser ICAO 90-minute recommendation."3 '
In 1977, the FAA granted the first deviation from section
121.161, allowing a 15-minute extension to the 60-minute rule
123 JOHN SuTrON, TECHNOLOGY AND MARKET STRUCTURE 453 (1998).
124 Timeline: A Glance at Airbus'Key Dates, AIRBus, http://www.airbus.com/com-
pany/history/the-timeline/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 McGuIRE, supra note 80, at 49.
128 AIRBus, supra note 70, at 14.
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130 See William H. Gregory, Eastern Weighing Reequipment Needs, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Aug. 1, 1977, at 29.
131 See id.
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for flights to the Caribbean.'3 2 The FAA approved Eastern Air-
lines to operate twin-engine Airbus A300s from New York to San
Juan under a 75-minute rule. 13 The FAA also approved Air Flor-
ida to operate twin-engine 737s from New York to Port Au
Prince.'3 4 Guiding the FAA's decision was the benign nature of
the Western Atlantic Caribbean Sea in 1977. 135 The area offered
numerous airports and reliable communications, navigation,
and air traffic control services and facilities. And the prevailing
weather conditions were stable and generally did not approach
extremes in temperature, wind, ceiling, or visibility.'3 6
Despite making inroads into the American market, the A300
was not initially a success.'3 7 Airbus soon turned its attention to
developing a longer range derivative of the A300, the A310.13 8
Airbus's development of the A310 caused Boeing to consider-
and ultimately adopt-a twin-engine configuration for its next
generation of passenger planes. Launched in 1978 (and devel-
oped in tandem), the Boeing 757 and 767 were designed to of-
fer longer range performance, with better fuel efficiency than
comparable existing Boeing models.'3
The 757 was designed to replace the 727.140 It shared the
727's fuselage diameter, but with only two engines and by incor-
porating new technologies, the 757 offered significantly better
operating economics.' One operator would later comment
that the "187-seat 757 [was] 70.5% more fuel-efficient than the
148-seat 727 on the basis of available seat miles [per] gallon on a
[500-mile] trip."14 2
The larger 767 was designed to fill a niche between larger
double-aisle jumbo jets like the 747 and smaller single-aisle
132 ADVISORY CIRCULAR 120-42A, supra note 53, at 1.
133 Airline Observer, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 5, 1977, at 35.
134 See TAYLOR, WORLDWIDE OPERATION, sujrra note 56, at 12.
135 See ADVISORY CIRCUIAR 120-42A, supra note 53, at 1.
136 See id.
137 Yoshina, supra note 101.
138 Id.
139 Fast Facts: Boeing 767, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/news/feature/
sevenseries/767.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2013); see also SERLING, supra note 86, at
388.
140 JOHN G. WENSVEEN & ALEXANDER T. WELLS, AIR TRANSPORTATION 397 (6th
ed. 2007).
141 Delta Purchases 60 Boeing 757s, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 17, 1980,
at 26.
142 Delta Foresees Savings on Crew, Fuel Efficiency, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
June 3, 1985, at 105.
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jets.14 3 The 767 was a double-aisle, wide-body jet offering seven-
abreast seating. 1 4 4 To maximize fuel efficiency, the 767 was-
after significant consideration-designed as a twin-engine air-
plane.14 1 Production of the 767 began in 1978 when United Air-
lines ordered thirty.14 6 The 767 entered service four years
later.1 4 7
Boeing initially envisioned eligible airlines taking advantage
of the 90-minute rule by using longer range 767s to serve trans-
atlantic routes and routes between the Middle East and Western
Europe.14 8 Flying 767s between North America and Europe of-
fered significant benefits: an airline could profitably fly the 767
on less trafficked routes. For example, flying a 747 from St.
Louis to Paris, seating 370 passengers, would cost $56,000 and
consume 2,508 gallons of fuel; flying a 767 with 190 passengers
would cost $30,000 and consume 1,078 gallons of fuel.'4 ' But
the 60-minute rule presented a sales obstacle for Boeing and an
operating hurdle for U.S. airlines. The business rationale for al-.
tering the 60-minute rule was apparent both to the airlines and
to Boeing.
II. THE PUSH FOR EXTENDED OPERATIONS
A. MANUFACTURERS PROPOSE MODIFYING THE 60-MINUTE RULE
In 1980, Boeing approached the FAA about modifying the 60-
minute rule. But despite having granted small deviations for
Caribbean flights, the FAA showed little enthusiasm for ex-
tended-range twin-engine flights. When approached by Boeing
Vice President Dick Taylor, FAA Administrator Lynn Helms re-
plied, "It'll be a cold day in hell before I let twins fly long-haul
over-water routes."'5 0 Helms later added, "The requirement for
three- or four-engine aircraft for oceanic flight will continue for
quite some time, and I don't mean only a year or two."15'
143 WENSVEEN & WELLS, supra note 140, at 65.
144 707 Family, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/boeing/commercial/707fam-
ily/index.page (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
145 See SERLING, supra note 86, at 388-89.
146 767 Program Milestones, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/boeing/commer-
cial/767family/pf/pfmilestones.page (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).
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Helms would later reiterate his opposition at an international
aviation conference in late 1983.152 " [T] he chief issue is not en-
gine reliability," he explained, but whether a plane's critical sub-
systems could be powered by a single engine.1 5 3 If an
uncontained engine failure damaged an aircraft, forcing it to fly
at peak icing altitudes between 7,000 and 21,000 feet, a single
operating engine would have to power the aircraft and subsys-
tems, including electrical, hydraulic, and avionics, and also per-
form deicing.14 Helms added that the 60-minute rule was
possibly too loose.1 5
But Boeing continued to build a case for twin-engine ex-
tended operations. 1 5 And despite Helms's opposition, in late
1982, the FAA held first-round technical discussions with aircraft
manufacturers and international aviation organizations, includ-
ing the ICAO, which had formed a study group in 1982'15 to
consider twin-engine extended operations and determine
whether new-generation twins should fly extended-range
routes.'5 At a conference in Montreal in December 1982, the
FAA asked aircraft manufacturers to gather data about engine
reliability and fuel consumption in twin-engine aircraft
operations."
Jerald Davis, manager of the FAA's flight technical programs
branch, explained that because limited information was availa-
ble about new two-engine aircraft, the FAA and other regulatory
organizations needed to build a database of engine reliability
before altering regulations.o The FAA would also have to con-
sider the potential loss of a critical flight operations system on a
twin-engine aircraft that could impair a deviation to the nearest
airport.1 6' "There has been no serious consideration up to now
for these aircraft. . . . The range capability didn't exist," Davis
said.' 6 2
152 Helms Affirms Overwater Extension Opposition, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
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In July 1983, two contemporaneous incidents on 767 flights
no doubt caught the attention of regulators. On July 23, 1983,
Air Canada Flight 143, a 767 carrying sixty-one passengers and
six crewmembers, departed Montreal bound for Edmonton via
Ottawa.16 3 Before departure, a fuel quantity sensor on the 767
malfunctioned, and the ground crew had to measure the fuel
quantity with a dipstick.' 64 The dipstick read in centimeters,
which the crew converted into liters and then into kilograms for
a weight measurement."' A conversion error resulted in Flight
143 taking off only half fueled. At 40,000 feet, one Pratt &
Whitney JT9D-7R4 engine flamed out.'6 6 Shortly after, the sec-
ond engine stopped. 6 7 With both engines out and minimal
equipment functioning, Captain R.O. Pearson (with ten years of
experience as a glider pilot) glided the 767 for 15 minutes to a
no-flaps emergency landing at a former Canadian Armed Forces
air base.168
A month later, the crew of United Airlines Flight 310 shut
down both engines of their 767 mid-flight.' While descending
through thunderstorms, the 767, carrying 197 passengers, lost
electrical power and both engines began to overheat. 70 In re-
sponse, the pilots shut down both engines. The aircraft de-
scended about 4,900 feet before the pilots restarted both
engines and landed safely.1 7 ' The problem was traced to a noz-
zle-coking problem.1 7 1
Air Canada Flight 143 was one of many subjects addressed
when Boeing's Dick Taylor presented a technical paper in sup-
port of extended operations to the Royal Aeronautical Society in
London in late 1983. Taylor argued that aircraft reliability had
improved dramatically in the thirty years since the adoption of
163 James Ott, Air Canada 767 Lands Dead Stick After Rameouts, AVIATION WK. &
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the 60-minute rule.1 3 The odds of two separate engine failures
occuring on the same flight Vvere infinitesimally small.
While Air Canada Flight 143 demonstrated that a twin-engine
plane could lose both engines in flight, running out of fuel will
stop all engines on a plane, regardless of the number of engines.
Thus, Taylor argued, having three or four engines protects only
against the extremely rare instance of two engines failing for in-
dependent reasons." 4 Moreover, the ETOPS portion of a flight
(when the plane exceeds 60 minutes flying time from an air-
port) by definition occurs only during the cruise portion of a
flight-statistically the safest part of the journey. 17 5
Taylor noted that foreign jurisdictions had allowed extended-
range twin-engine flights without issue. Between 1980 and 1985,
thirteen nations had some type of twin-engine extended opera-
tions, either in scheduled or charter flights.17 6 Similarly, U.S.
military and private business jets were exempt from the 60-min-
ute rule and had flown such routes without issue.177
Taylor acknowledged the concern of FAA Administrator
Helms: whether a single engine could power a plane's critical
subsystems. In response, Taylor proposed design considerations
to ensure adequate redundancy if an engine shut down."7
These designs included redundant sources of hydraulic power
(used to operate a plane's control surfaces), redundant sources
of electrical power, and an ice-protection system capable of op-
erating with only one functioning engine."'7 To further improve
reliability, Taylor proposed expanded maintenance procedures
to identify incipient part failures or performance deteriorations
before in-flight failures occur.so He also recommended fixed-
interval maintenance rather than condition-triggered mainte-
nance-i.e., parts would be replaced before they failed.'" Tay-
lor also proposed mandating fire suppression capabilities in the
173 See TAYLOR, WORLDWIDE OPERATION, supra note 56, at 7.
174 See id. at 14.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 12; see also ROBERT W. SIMPSON & RAYMOND A. AUSROTAS, A REVIEW OF
EXTENDED-RANGE OPERATIONS BY TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT 22 (1987), available at
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plane's cargo area that would be sufficient to contain a fire for
as long as needed to divert the plane.1 2
In late 1983, Boeing formally applied for a change in the 60-
minute rule in a letter from Boeing Vice President Joseph F.
Sutter' 3 to Helms.184 The FAA circulated the proposal for com-
ment."1 Helms, the key skeptic of loosening the 60-minute rule,
left the FAA in January 1984, although "his attitude toward the
Boeing proposal was more favorable before he left office.""'
Helms was reportedly won over by Boeing's inclusion of addi-
tional sources of electrical power and fire suppression systems in
the cargo bays."'
B. THE ICAO CONSIDERS MODIFYING THE 90-MINUTE RULE
FOR TWIN-ENGINE PASSENGER PLANES
While Boeing was pushing for an extension of the 60-minute
rule, Airbus negotiated with the ICAO to extend the existing 90-
minute recommendation to 120 minutes.'88 At the same time,
the ICAO was considering whether to amend the 90-minute rule
to create a specific limit for twin-engine planes (the 90-minute
rule applied to all planes regardless of the number of engines)
and whether twin-engine planes should be restricted to a more
conservative limit similar to the FAA's 60-minute rule.1 89
In October 1983, the ICAO ETOPS study group wrote in a
working paper that there was considerable doubt that the 90-
minute restriction had any operational validity with respect to
twins.1 oo The then-current 90-minute rule was "only guidance
material without any rationale to back it up."' Providing a rule
with more substantive guidance was in everyone's interest.'92
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The ICAO ETOPS study group recommended reducing twin-en-
gine flights to 60 minutes.'"
In 1983, the ICAO held two meetings and correspondences
with representatives from the regulatory agencies of France,
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States; manufac-
turers and operators; the International Air Transport Associa-
tion; and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots
Association (IFALPA). 19'
At an October 1983 ICAO meeting, participants failed to
agree on a new 90-minute rule.' 9 The ICAO airworthiness au-
thority asked for a reduction of the 90-minute rule for twins,' 6
while airlines and manufacturers strongly opposed the reduc-
tion.'9 7 Outsiders predicted a 75-minute compromise for single-
engine operation.'
Airbus opposed the reduction to 60 minutes for twins, noting
that its twins had already operated successfully under the 90-
minute rule.'99 It also noted that the FAA had already granted a
75-minute deviation for the Airbus A300." Pointing to the
A300's safety and reliability records, Airbus recommended that
the present 90-minute, all-engine time limit be kept in place for
twin-engine planes.2 0'
The IFALPA sought to tighten the 90-minute rule for twin-
engine planes, possibly to parallel the United States' 60-minute
rule.02 A representative from the British Air Line Pilots Associa-
tion argued, "[W]e do not think that the statistics can hold up
against the philosophic argument . . . . This sort of rule would
be tantamount to permitting single-engine passenger flights
over water, which is something that's not permitted over
land."203 At the same time, pilots' associations were not entirely
opposed to twin-engine extended operations under some cir-
cumstances. But they demanded assurances that such flights
would be safe, particularly proof that the twin-engine aircraft
193 Oceanic-Twin Rules Tightened, FLICHT INT'L, Mar. 31, 1984, at 793.
194 ICAO Working Paper 5693, supra note 75, at 2.
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could maintain engine and subsystems reliability for sustained
transoceanic flight.204
IFALPA delegates adopted a new policy regarding overwater
flights.2 1o" The IFALPA's proposal largely mirrored Boeing's, but
it included three- and four-engine as well as twin-engine air-
craft.0s It proposed factors including demonstrated engine and
systems reliability; the ability to continue to operate all essential
systems with a single engine failure; and adequate support
mechanisms, such as air traffic control availability, communica-
tions channels, meteorological information, and search-and-res-
cue facilities, in the event of an engine failure.2 17 The IFALPA's
resolution stated that the current level of safety on long-range
operations with three- and four-engine aircraft was the mini-
mum acceptable level.208
The ICAO study group reached a similar conclusion. Twin-
engine extended operations could be permitted if four general
requirements were satisfied: (1) the plane was specifically certi-
fied for ETOPS, taking into account its "system reliability and
the possibility of flying for long periods with only one engine
operating"; (2) the plane's engine reliability made "the risk of
double engine failure from independent causes . . . acceptably
low"; (3) "specific flight dispatch requirements were met"; and
(4) "specific operational authorization was granted by the State
of the Operator."o2 " The study group believed that 60 minutes
on a single operating engine was the appropriate threshold for
requiring enhanced flight rules, particularly because twin-en-
gine planes rarely operated beyond that amount of time.2
C. ETOPS TAKEs FoRM
As extensions to the 60- and 90-minute rules were considered,
airlines began testing the 7 67's potential for transatlantic flights.
Israeli airline El Al was the first customer to receive an ex-
tended-range 767 derivative, the 767-200ER.' On March 27,
1984, El Al began the first commercial non-stop transatlantic
204 See id.
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flight by a Boeing 767-200ER.2 12 The flight-the longest 767
flight to date-was an eleven-hour, 5,800-mile journey from
Montreal to Tel Aviv. 2 13 The flight operated within the 60-min-
ute rule. 1
By mid-1984, Boeing began flight-testing a 767 with the addi-
tional redundancies proposed by Taylor.15 The 767 included a
fourth electrical generator that was independently powered by a
hydraulic motor.2 16 This was in addition to the two-engine-
driven systems and the Auxiliary Power Unit (a separate gas-
powered turbine engine in the tail).21 7 With four independent
power sources, the 767 had the electrical power equivalent of
other three-engine overwater aircraft.2 1 1
At the same time, the FAA began drafting an advisory circular
on extending the 60-minute rule to 120 minutes under certain
conditions.2 1' The 120-minute extension was comparable to the
90-minute ICAO rule because the FAA measured 120 minutes
on a single-engine speed, while the ICAO measured 90 minutes
on two-engine speed. "
In June 1984, Boeing briefed the new FAA head, Donald D.
Engen, on the 767's overwater capabilities.2 2 ' Boeing under-
scored the 767's capabilities by scheduling a 6,503-nautical-mile
delivery flight of an Ethiopian Airlines 767-200ER from Wash-
ington Dulles International to Addis Ababa (the flight stayed
within the ICAO's 90-minute guideline) .222 Further, Boeing em-
phasized that no cruise, non-restartable engine shutdown had
occurred on a 767 flight in 1984 (though six occurred in
1983) .223
In July, the FAA issued a draft advisory circular for twin-en-
gine extended operations. The circular stated that it provided
212 El Al Retires Veteran 767 Aircraft, EL Ai, (Oct. 11, 2011), www.elal.co.il/elal/
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213 News Digest, supra note 211, at 27.
214 Id.
215 See Boeing Presses 767 Overwater Certification, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,






221 Boeing Urges 2-Engine Ruling, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., June 4, 1984, at
32.
222 Id.; see Ethiopian 767 Sets Distance Record, FLIGHT INT'L, June 16, 1984, at
1532.
223 Boeing Urges 2-Engine Ruling, supra note 221, at 32.
27
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
an acceptable-but not the only-means for obtaining approval
for extended operations.2 2 ' The advisory circular required a
level of safety and redundancy comparable to long-range opera-
tions of three- and four-engine turbine-powered airplanes. 225 It
proposed criteria under headings of airworthiness, in-service ex-
perience, and operations. 2 2 6 The draft included six design
criteria:
(1) "[a]n acceptably low risk of double engine failure";
(2) demonstrated "propulsion system reliability based on in-
service experience with a particular airplane-engine
combination";
(3) "essential or critical airframe systems" are operational if
an engine fails;
(4) "[a] ssessment of an air carrier and manufacturer's main-
tenance programs in achieving a level of systems reliabil-
ity for a particular airplane-engine combination";
(5) "[r]eview of an air carrier's training programs, opera-
tions, and maintenance programs to assess ability to
maintain systems reliability with a particular airplane-en-
gine combination"; and
(6) "[a]pplication of fail-safe criteria for design of engines
and essential or critical systems of a particular
airplane."2
With regard to demonstrated propulsion system reliability,
the FAA proposed to assess engine reliability only after an en-
gine type obtained a combined 250,000 hours of operation on a
particular airplane-engine combination (though the advisory
circular opened the door for exceptions based on "adequate
compensating factors"). 2 28 At the time, Boeing offered the 767
with two engine options: Pratt & WhitneyJT9D-7R4 and General
Electric CF6-80A. The 767 and Pratt & Whitney JT9D-7R4 en-
gines combination had accumulated 276,920 hours, while the
General Electric CF6-80A combination had accumulated
191,400 hours.2 29 The FAA stated that it would publish a report
on its engine reliability data.230 Demonstrated reliability was de-
224 See ADVIsoRY CIRCULAR 120-42A, supra note 53, at 1.
225 James Ott, FAA Prepares Overwater Guides, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., July
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fined as a maximum number of engine shutdowns per set num-
ber of flight hours.2 3 ' The engines would be required to
maintain a maximum shutdown rate of 0.05 shutdowns per
1,000 flight hours (i.e., 5 shutdowns per 100,000 hours).23 2 Cal-
culations showed that 0.05 was a safe threshold based on the risk
of a dual, unrelated shutdown during 120-minute ETOPS.2 33
Boeing figures also showed that the 0.05 figure was achievable
by current engines. 23 4
Airlines would separately qualify for extended-range opera-
235tions. Eligible carriers would be required to operate a particu-
lar airplane-engine combination for at least twelve consecutive
months. 3 From this, the FAA would develop a report from the
maintenance review board on scheduled maintenance, replace-
ment, and inspection programs for the particular aircraft.
If all conditions were satisfied, a qualified airplane and airline
would be permitted to fly extended-operation flights up to 120
minutes from a suitable airport.2 3 8 The 120-minute limit could
be increased by up to 15% if the carrier met "special require-
ments for propulsion reliability, operating practices, crew train-
ing, and equipment."239
Responding to the draft advisory circular, McDonnell Doug-
las-a manufacturer of twin-engine aircraft that did not offer
long-range capability at the time-took a more reserved posi-
tion.2 40 It noted that ETOPS "represents a 'totally new risk' that
the industry has a limited capability to offset."a2 1 McDonnell
Douglas argued that "'the possible adverse consequences of pre-
mature extension of the operating limits can never be balanced
by economic gain.'" 24 2 Finally, "[tihe existing rule has contrib-
231 ADVISORY CIRCULAR 120-42A, supra note 53, at 19-20.
232 Id.
233 Email from Daryl Heinzerling, Boeing, to J. Angelo DeSantis, UC Davis
School of Law (Mar. 1, 2013, 06:27 PST) (on file author).
234 Id.
235 ADVISORY CIRCULAR 120-42A, supra note 53, at 11.
236 Id.
237 Ott, FAA Prepares Overwater Guides, supra note 225, at 28.
238 Id.
239 Id.
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uted to the industry's outstanding safety level and 'should not
be lightly or prematurely superseded.'"243
III. THE BEGINNING OF ETOPS PASSENGER FLIGHTS
A. FLYING 120 MINUTES FROM AN AIRPORT
In January 1985, John M. Swihart of Boeing wrote in Aerospace
America, "One day this winter-possibly even this month-avia-
tion history will be made, very quietly." 24 4 On February 1, 1985,
TWA flew the first revenue flight under the draft Advisory Circu-
lar 120-42.245 The TWA 767-200 flew from Boston to Paris under
a 75-minute deviation from the 60-minute rule.246 The 767-200
had been retrofitted to satisfy the circular's requirements. 247
Under the 75-minute deviation, the flight took 20 to 30 minutes
longer than a direct "Great Circle" flight would have, but the
flight was seventy-six miles shorter than the same route under
the 60-minute rule.2 48 Flight 810 consumed approximately
10,000 pounds of fuel per hour-7,000 pounds per hour less
than the three-engine L-1011 that typically operated the
route.4
Passenger opposition to flying a twin-engine plane on an
overwater, long-haul flight was non-existent.25 o Passengers sur-
veyed for their opinions of the 767 in comparison to other wide-
body transports were either positive or indicated that they did
not fully understand what they were flying on.25 1 And when the
crew announced the historic nature of the flight, it was uninter-
esting news to most passengers. 252
In February 1985, the FAA published in the Federal Register a
notice of availability of the draft Advisory Circular 120-42 and
wrote that current two-engine airplanes "provide levels of redun-
dancy (except with respect to the number of engines) and relia-
bility as good [as] or better than the levels exhibited by the
243 Id.
244 See Swihart, supra note 28, at 14.
245 See Ott, Boeing 767 North Atlantic Flights, supra note 3, at 31.
246 See id.; Brad Bachtel, ETOPS Extended Operations, and En Route Alternate Air-
ports, BOEING 6 (Oct. 3, 2003), www.boeing.com/commercial/airports/faqs/
etopseropsenroutealt.pdf.
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previous generation of three- and four-engine airplanes." 253 Cur-
rent turbine engines are "much less likely to fail than many
older models."2 5 ' Thus, twin-engine "extended range operations
should be permitted" if airplanes and airlines "meet stringent
airworthiness and operating standards ... designed to ensure
that the level of safety provided to the traveling public would in
no way be reduced."2 5 5
The notice continued, explaining the draft criteria would pro-
vide "safety equal to or better than that required of three- or
four-engine airplanes currently flying these routes."*2 The draft
Advisory Circular would "implement the work of the [ICAO's]
Extended Range Operations (ETOPS) Study Group, which the
[United States] actively participated in and supported."2 5 1
In March 1985, the United Kingdom's aviation regulatory
body, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), also signaled a willing-
ness to permit extended-range twin-engine flights. 5' The CAA
called twin-engine jets "'inherently more vulnerable"' than
three- or four-engine aircraft, but it believed that improved
safety standards could allow twins to match the safety of bigger
planes. 259
In June 1985, the FAA formally issued Advisory Circular 120-
42, defining a process for obtaining 120-minute extended opera-
tions approval.2 0
B. ETOPS FLIGHTS GROW IN THE ATLANTIC
Flying 767 ETOPS flights between North America and Europe
offered airlines logistical benefits. The 767 transported half the
payload of a 747, but reached almost the same flight distance. 6 '
253 See Advisory Circular; Extended Range Operations with Two-Engine Air-
planes, 50 Fed. Reg. 5,150, 5,150-51 (Feb. 6, 1985).
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This increased the number of point-to-point routes an airline
could profitably operate. 6 2 Carrying a smaller payload the same
distance was highly desirable to airlines. 63 Indeed many airlines
bought the original 747 jumbo jet for its range rather than its
payload.26 4 This could be a costly proposition because a 747-100
only 70% full would still use approximately 95% of its normal
fuel load.26 6
In May 1985, while airlines were beginning ETOPS opera-
tions, Boeing began collecting, "on a worldwide basis, a com-
plete [database of] incidents of the major systems of its 767s,
including electrical power; hydraulic power; air conditioning
and pressurization; and automatic flight and navigation."2 6 6
From May 1985 through December 1986, 13,000 ETOPS flights
led to twenty-five reported events: twenty-one flights turned back
or diverted, while four continued to their destinations.2 6 7 Six
events occurred during the ETOPS portion of the flight (i.e.,
where the plane was more than 60 minutes from an airport). '6
The FAA also closely monitored ETOPS flights. An FAA offi-
cial admitted being "'a little surprised at the frequency of en-
gine problems in the first six months."'2 6 1 In three instances,
maintenance issues caused oil shortages that forced crews to
shut down engines. 270 In one event, "mechanics failed to tighten
an accessory on a gearbox, which permitted oil to leak."2 7 1
In December 1985, the FAA type certified a second aircraft
for 120-minute ETOPS: the Boeing 737-200.2 The 757 was type
262 See BIRTLES, BOEING 767, supra note 149, at 48.
263 Id.
264 See Carole A. Shifrin, British Airways Starts Transatlantic Service with new Boeing
747-400s, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 14, 1989, at 62.; Bruce A. Smith,
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TECH., Jan. 1, 2001, at 28.
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certified in 1986. The first Airbus aircraft, the A310 and A300-
600, were also type certified for ETOPS in 1986.
By the winter of 1986, five airlines were operating forty-nine
ETOPS-certified 767s over the North Atlantic and had flown
more than 3,000 flights.2 75 By 1987, the number of ETOPS oper-
ators had grown to fourteen.2 7 6 By 1990, 175 ETOPS-certified
767s were operating more than 4,000 ETOPS flights per month.
Two years later, among U.S. carriers, more twin-engine planes
were crossing the North Atlantic than three- and four-engine
aircraft.277
IV. FLYING BEYOND TWO HOURS FROM A
SUITABLE AIRPORT
A. FLYING 180 MINUTES FROM AN AIRPORT
By 1987, manufacturers and operators began pushing to ex-
tend 120-minute ETOPS flights.2 7 8 Some key routes remained
off-limits to 120-minute ETOPS flights: a flight to Hawaii from
the mainland was outside the 120-minute limit.27 9 Allowing 180-
minute ETOPS flights would open routes from Europe, Austra-
lia, and Africa to South America.2 8 0 It would also permit routes
that take advantage of better winds and weather. 28 1 For example,
a 120-minute ETOPS flight requires three alternate airports to
cross the North Atlantic. 28 2 "On northern routes [,] Keflavik Air-
port in Iceland and Sondre Stromfjord Airbase in Greenland
273 757-200 Background, BOEING, www.boeing.com/boeing/commercial/
757family/pf/pf_200back.page (last visited May 27, 2013).
274 Overview of New ETOPS/LROPS/EDTO Rules, ICAO 5 (Oct. 2011), www.mex-
ico.icao.int/Meetings/RASGPA/RASGPA4/Presentation lAirbus.pdf.
275 RICHARD, W. TAYLOR, BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE COMPANY, TWIN-ENGINE
TRANSPORTs: A LOOK AT THE FUTURE 11 (1990).
276 See Ott, Engine Reliability, supra note 269, at 36.
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minutes of ETOPS flight. Email from Daryl W. Heinzerling, Boeing Co. (June
2013).
280 Review Criticizes FAA's Criteria for Approving Twin-Engine EROPS, AVIATION WK.
& SPACE TECH., Apr. 18, 1988, at 85.
281 Id.
282 TWA Expects Solid ETOPS Record Will Ease Transition to A330, AVIATION WK. &
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are within range," but if weather prevents landing at those air-
ports, a 120-minute ETOPS aircraft must fly farther south."
In the event of a diversion, 180-minute ETOPS would also of-
fer pilots a "wider choice of alternate airports. "284 Some argued
that having a "wider choice of alternate airports" would enhance
safety: in an emergency, pilots could divert to a farther airport
offering safer landing conditions. 8
Improvements in engine reliability also supported increasing
the ETOPS limit. From September 1985 to May 1987, no Pratt &
Whitney JT9D-7R4 engine had shut down during the ETOPS
portion of a 767 flight.28 ' And General Electric's CF6-80A and
CF6-80C2 engines never caused an in-flight shutdown in the
ETOPS portion of a flight (though twenty-seven in-flight shut-
downs of the CF6-80A occurred during non-ETOPS opera-
tions)."2 Pratt & Whitney and Boeing submitted data to the FAA
that supported extending diversion time to 180 minutes.288
The FAA, however, took a cautious approach. Jerald M. Davis
of the FAA's Office of Flight Standards noted that no en-
gine-airframe combination had reached one million engine
flight hours.28 9 "The carriers are doing a good job, but the re-
cord needs to be expanded with a few more operators," Davis
said.o
In April 1987, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Flight Transportation Laboratory Department of Aeronautics &
Astronautics completed a report on ETOPS commissioned by
the FAA. 29' The study criticized the FAA's procedures and meth-
ods for evaluating ETOPS flights.2 9 2 It pointed out "shortcom-
ings in the methodology and reliability calculations that
manufacturers, [the] FAA and other airworthiness authorities
use [d] to define EROPS risks." 29 3
283 Id
284 Review Criticizes FAA's Citeria for Approving Twin-Engine EROPS, supra note
280, at 85.
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The report criticized ETOPS rules that measure maximum di-
version time in minutes rather than distance." Though ETOPS
flights were restricted to flying within 120 minutes from an air-
port, strong headwinds "could increase the actual interval by
20% or more."29 5 This increase could pose a hazard considering
that many ETOPS safety measures, such as cargo fire suppres-
sion, were designed to provide protection for only the 120-min-
ute interval (and perhaps a few extra minutes for ground
evacuation) .296 The report added, "This inconsistency would not
stand serious scrutiny by lawyers looking for careless or incom-
plete efforts on the part of airworthiness authorities after an
accident."29
More fundamentally, the report criticized the lack of a "clear
statement of how risk is being assessed in ETOPS."298 It noted
that while the ICAO study group created two risk models, the
models lacked "rigor or detail."2 ' The report also criticized the
FAA for not requiring airlines to perform test flights with only a
single operating engine.30 0 Airlines that voluntarily performed
such flights had uncovered issues that needed to be ad-
dressed.3 0 ' The report stated, "It seems odd that the traveling
public may be onboard when approved diversionary procedures
are actually flown for the first time."30 2 The FAA initially resisted
a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for the report
from the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), but the agency re-
leased the report a year later in April 1988.03
While the FAA was considering the extension, troubles on
76 7 s again caught regulators' attention.0 ' In January 1988-in
the span of four days-three 767s diverted (two in ETOPS
flights).so0 On January 14, a TWA 767 with Pratt & Whitney
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Goose Bay "when the crew shut down the No. 2 engine after
receiving an oil bypass indicator warning."o 6 The crew later
found metal chips in the oil filter. 0 7 On January 18, another
TWA 767 out of Paris shut down an engine following a high-oil-
temperature reading.308 The flight was diverted to Montreal. 30 9
The same day, a non-ETOPS 767 flight from Los Angeles to
Washington, D.C., diverted to Kansas City when the No. 1 en-
gine "experienced repeated surges."310
Despite these issues, in February 1988, newly-appointed FAA
Administrator Allan McArtor announced that the FAA would ac-
celerate its consideration of a 180-minute rule and directed his
staff to finish the process by the fall.3 1' Aviation Week & Space
Technology, an industry publication, opined the following:
The FAA has been under strong pressure to increase the diver-
sion time maximums from aircraft and engine manufacturers
anxious to expand markets since the 1970s. Permission to use
twin-engine aircraft such as the Boeing 737-300, 757-200 [, and
particularly the 767-300ER on EROPS312 routes would signifi-
cantly increase Boeing's potential markets. 1 3
On December 30, 1988 (nine days after the bombing of a Pan
Am 747 over Lockerbie, Scotland), the FAA released AC 120-
42A, allowing for 180-minute ETOPS. 3 14 AC 120-42A condi-
tioned 180-minute certification on increased reliability-beyond
that required for 120-minute ETOPS."" It created tiers of certifi-
cation for ETOPS: 75-, 120-, and 180-minute tiers .3 1 Type certi-
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engine hours." Operational certification would require an air-
line to operate under approved 120-minute ETOPS for one year
before gaining approval for 180-minute ETOPS."' Certified
planes and engines must maintain a maximum in-flight shut-
down rate of 0.02/1000 hours (two failures per every 100,000
engine hours) .31 The FAA would periodically review the propul-
sion system reliability of aircraft operating under 180-minute
ETOPS, as was required for 120-minute operations, but with
shorter scheduled intervals.120
AC 120-42A also required sufficient fire suppression capability
to suppress a fire during maximum diversion under 180-minute
ETOPS.121 Modifying a 767 to provide three hours of fire sup-
pression would cost about $20,000 per plane.3 2 2
Airplanes and airlines could still qualify for 120-minute
ETOPS under the old standards of 0.05 shutdowns per 1,000
flight hours (or five shutdowns per 100,000 hours).323
In January 1989, American Airlines flew a 767-300ER aircraft
on a validation flight from Dallas to Hawaii under the 180-min-
ute rule.3 2' By April 1989, both the 767-300ER and GE CF6-80C2
engines received type certification for 180-minute ETOPS, and
American Airlines received the first 180-minute operational cer-
tification.2 Underlying the approval was the fact that American
Airlines had achieved an impressive reliability record. By mid-
December, the airline was expected to fly its 20,000th transatlan-
tic crossing and was operating more than 780 ETOPS flights per
month. 3 26 During that time, American Airlines had an in-flight
shutdown rate of 0.019 per 1,000 engine flight hours on its 767-
200 and no shutdowns on its 767-300s. 2
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318 Id. at 15.
319 Id. at 5.
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B. ETOPS BY THE EARLY 1990s
June 1990 marked the five-year anniversary of ETOPS." In
1990, Boeing 767s were crossing the Atlantic approximately
1,764 times each month.329 Boeing 757s flew approximately 397
extended-range flights each month.33 o And airlines were also op-
erating the twin-engine A310 across the Atlantic, with Airbus
counting thirty-three city pairs linking Europe and North
America with A310s. 31 By April 1992, ETOPS flights accounted
for one of every three North Atlantic crossings.3 Among U.S.
carriers, ETOPS crossings over the Atlantic exceeded three- and
four-engine crossings by late 1991.' Engine reliability "gener-
ally exceeded expectations in figures monitored by both Canada
and the [United States]." 3 Of the major Canadian carriers,
both had shutdown rates below 0.01; in fact, one carrier that
operated 767-300ERs with General Electric CF6 powerplants
had a rate as low as 0.006.
Additionally, the more stringent ETOPS maintenance re-
quirements were reaping unexpected benefits for carriers. 3
Dispatch reliability improved.3 3 7 And reducing in-flight shut-
downs not only improved safety, but also provided significant
cost savings to airlines.338 In 1991, the cost of an in-flight shut-
down was substantial.3 39 At a seminar, airline attendees were
asked to estimate the cost of an in-flight shutdown. 34 0 The aver-
age estimate was $850,000.341 One-third of the respondents esti-
mated associated losses for each shutdown at more than $1
million, not including the indirect costs of customer dissatisfac-
tion.34 2 By comparison, an airline's average annual profit per air-
328 James Ott, North Atlantic Traffic to Hit Record with New Services, AVIATION WK.
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craft was estimated in an industry study to be approximately
$639,000 (depending on many factors). 4 3 Thus, in 1991, the
cost of a single in-flight shutdown could exceed the annual
profit from flying an airplane.3 4 4
Engine manufacturers with a vested interest in reducing in-
flight shutdowns on ETOPS flights developed improved proce-
dures to reduce shutdowns.4 Pratt & Whitney, for example, en-
couraged operators to undertake external inspections for frayed
wires, missing clamps, and loose nuts that had caused in-flight
shutdowns on ETOPS aircraft in the past."' Recognizing the ec-
onomics of improved reliability, airlines began to incorporate
these enhanced maintenance techniques on non-ETOPS
flights. At a June 1991 symposium, Tom Edwards Jr. presented
a paper on behalf of United Airlines explaining how United had
implemented ETOPS practices on its ETOPS-exempt 747s,
which greatly reduced the number of in-flight shutdowns.3 4 8
In 1992, the former director of operations for Pan Am ex-
plained the ETOPS pre-flight check.3 4 9 Maintenance crews
would conduct an "over-ocean" check of the aircraft's fluid
levels and standby systems.3 5 0 They would then plug a laptop
computer into the engines to perform diagnostic checks.3 5 1 The
readouts would be stored and compared to detect trends that
might predict an in-flight shutdown. 5
V. EARLY ETOPS AND THE BOEING 777
A. TROUBLE SELLING THE WoRLD's LARGEST TWIN
The 1990s saw a major shake-up of aerospace companies.
By the decade's end, Airbus would emerge as a major industry
Z54 Id.
Id.
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manufacturer.3 54 And McDonnell Douglas-largely forced out
of the commercial airplane business by Airbus-would merge
with Boeing, leaving Boeing and Airbus as the two remaining
major commercial aviation manufacturers. 5 5
In the early 1990s, airlines sought to eventually replace or sup-
plement their older 747s, L-1011s, and DC-1Os. 3 5 6 The 767 and
A310 had demonstrated the value of smaller, more efficient
planes capable of long-haul flights. Airlines wanted the range of
a 747, the seat capacity of a DC-10 or L-1011, and the efficiency
of a 767.
Boeing, Airbus, and McDonnell Douglas each prepared an of-
fering. 5 8 McDonnell Douglas was first to the market with the
300-seat, three-engine MD-11. 5 9 Launched in 1986 and begin-
ning revenue service at the end of 1990, the MD-1I was a DC-10
derivative. 6 o It offered better range and capacity than the DC-
10.361 But the MD-11 was a commercial disappointment with
only 200 sold.3 6 2
Several factors contributed to its failure. McDonnell Douglas
failed to deliver the MD-11 at the promised weight, range, and
fuel efficiency.3 6 Singapore Airlines very publically cancelled
their MD-11 order for that reason. 36 4 The MD-11 also struggled
against Boeing's 747-400, which offered the longest range at the
365time.
But perhaps the single largest reason for the MD-1 1's demise
was Airbus's offering: the 300-seat A330 and A340. Launched
simultaneously at the Paris Air show in 1987, the A330 and A340
354 Record-Breakers, AIRBUS, www.airbus.com/company/history/the-narrative/
record-breakers-1993-2000/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).
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were essentially two- and four-engine versions of the same
plane.3 "66 The A330, a wide-body twin-engine aircraft designed
for medium-haul flights, competed with the 767, offering larger
capacity and better economics. 36 7 The A340, with four engines,
added long-range capability to the A330's capacity. 68 And with
four engines, the A340 was exempt from the 60-minute rule. Ag-
gressively marketed, the A340 outsold the MD-11, forcing Mc-
Donnell Douglas out of commercial aviation. 3 6 9
Boeing's answer to the MD-11 and A340 differed in several
aspects. Launched in October 1990, Boeing's 777 was last to
enter the market; at twenty feet, four inches in diameter, the
777 was larger than the other offerings. 7 0 But its most distin-
guishing characteristic was its engines: it only had two. 7 1
Designing the 777 required the most powerful commercial jet
engines ever produced. The 80,000 pounds of thrust generated
by the first 777's engines was greater than the rocket that lifted
the first American into space.3 72 But even with such powerful-
and fuel thirsty-engines, a twin-engine configuration inher-
ently offered better economics.17 ' Two engines meant reduced
fuel consumption and drag, as compared to three or four en-
gines. It also reduced the number of engines needing
maintenance.
But with only two engines, the 777 fell within the ambit of the
60-minute rule.7 Under the existing ETOPS regime, this was a
serious obstacle: the 777 could fly 7,500 nautical miles, but it
would be largely limited to domestic routes under the 60-minute
rule until the 777's engines and airframe accumulated 250,000
flight hours. 7 5 And for operational certification, airlines would
need to operate the 777 for one year before qualifying for 120-
minute certification and two years before qualifying for 180-min-
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372 KARL SABBACH, TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY JET: THE MAKING AND MARKETING OF
THE BOEING 777, at 122 (1996).
3 Id. at 45.
34 Id.
5 Id. at 140.
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ute certification.3 7 6 By contrast, MD-11s and A340s could cross
the Pacific on delivery. 3 7 7
The need to immediately take advantage of a plane's long
range was of paramount concern to customers. An industry ob-
server explained that "[n] o airline wants to buy an airplane and
have to wait two or three years to fully utilize it."s78 Indeed, en-
gine maker Pratt & Whitney lost a sale of its PW4000 engine to
competitor General Electric's CF6-80C2 because the PW4000
had not acquired enough in-service hours to qualify for
ETOPS.17' The customer, Qantas, needed to begin ETOPS as
soon as possible, and the PW4000 was not expected to accumu-
late sufficient hours for ETOPS certification for another year.sso
B. BOEING PROPOSES ANOTHER MODIFICATION To ETOPS
To get around the requirement of two years in-flight experi-
ence, Boeing proposed another modification to ETOPS: it
sought to have the 777 receive 180-minute ETOPS certification
immediately upon entry into service.3 8 ' Boeing called this "early
ETOPS" or "ETOPS out-of-the-box." 8 2 Boeing had anticipated
that the in-service requirement would become a problem, and
in 1988, Boeing launched an internal study of alternatives to in-
service experience requirements for ETOPS.3 " On July 6, 1989,
Boeing CEO Phil Condit issued a policy that any new or deriva-
tive twin-engine Boeing airplane would support 180-minute
ETOPS at entry.384
Boeing proposed a set of design objectives to achieve early
ETOPS; chief among those objectives was an assurance that the
777 and its engines would enter the market "mature."8 The
engine would be designed to have a low shutdown rate at the
outset.38 6 In the early 1980s, reducing engine shutdown rates
during development was not a priority. Engines were built, and
through improvements and corrections, they "matured" into
6 Id. at 142.
37 Id.
8 Holusha, supra note 1, at 31.
3 Stanley W. Kandebo, Engine Markets Will Be Strong As Global Traffic Grows,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 14, 1988, at 194.
380 Id.
381 PANDEY, supra note 46, at 54.
382 Id.
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lower in-flight shutdown rates.38 With the 777, Boeing set an
expected shutdown rate "budget" and required that individual
components have a reliability rate that did not exceed the budg-
eted contribution to an engine shutdown. "
In late 1989, Boeing organized its first symposium on early
ETOPS at the Museum of Flight in Seattle.3" At the symposium,
FAA Associate Administrator Tony Broderick stated that the
FAA would keep an open mind toward early ETOPS.39 0 But, he
continued, "Operator in-service experience has also been instru-
mental in giving the FAA confidence that the operator's mainte-
nance, dispatch, and flight crew training programs and
operating procedures are satisfactory for ETOPS. . . . Eliminat-
ing this phase cannot be done without thought, preparation,
and analysis."3 "9 Boeing held a second early ETOPS symposium
in May of the following year.39 2 Both symposiums preceded the
7 7 7's official launch.
The FAA had previously considered an early ETOPS proposal
from various engine makers. One U.S. manufacturer proposed
early ETOPS certification for a 35,000-40,000 pound-thrust en-
gine."9 The proposal failed when the engine "simply did not
live up to expectations.""' A second proposal from another
manufacturer did not meet expectations either, despite the en-
gine's "'very low initial shutdown rate."'
Nevertheless, Broderick had a high opinion of ETOPS. In
May 1990, he called it "one of two programs in recent times
which have significantly improved aviation safety."39 6
On June 18, 1990, Boeing officially applied for a type certifi-
cate for the 777."9 Broderick opined, "'[I]n 1990, I wouldn't
sign any contracts to buy or sell an airplane with 180-minute
ETOPS approval out of the box as a condition.'"'
RA3 Id.
388 Id. at 56.
389 Id. at 57.
390 Id. at 58.
391 Id. at 59.
392 Id. at 60.
39 FAA Is Studying Proposals to Ease Requirements for Airline ETOPS, AVIATION WK.
& SPACE TECH., Jan. 22, 1990, at 29.
395 Id.
39 Id.
396 PANDEY, supra note 46, at 60 (the other being the aging aircraft programs).
397 Special Conditions: Extended Range Operation of Boeing 777 Series Air-
planes, 59 Fed. Reg. 28,234, 28,235 (June 1, 1994) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 25).
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As a means for satisfying the 250,000-engine-hours require-
ment for existing ETOPS certification, Boeing built a 3,000-cycle
engine test to simulate an engine acquiring a quarter million
hours.' Boeing also tested an additional 2,000 on-off cycles on
constructed aircraft, noting that 97% of propulsion system
problems occur in the first 3,000 cycles.' 00 Additionally, each
777 airframe-engine combination would conduct eight 180-
minute diversions on a single engine.4 01
Pilots were skeptical of early ETOPS. "'They are pushing the
edge of the envelope, and it's a pure marketing ploy on their
part,' said Bob Reich, a United Airlines first officer and member
of the ALPA committee tracking the issue."40 2 Furthermore,
Richard Livingston, [the] chairman of the Airline Passengers As-
sociation of North America and a former FAA official, cautioned:
"No amount of testing can take the place of real life, day-in and
day-out use. Before we go putting a couple of hundred people
out over some ocean, we think it's important that everything pos-
sible is done to assure the aircraft will, in fact, be reliable on
those routes."403
Gary Wagner, an Air Canada pilot who was skeptical of the origi-
nal ETOPS regulation, asked,
Do you want to take a new airplane out of the barn and, when
the paint is still wet, fly it to the edge of the envelope? Or, would
you rather fly it comfortably within the envelope for [a while],
until you're sure you've got all the bugs worked out?404
Nevertheless, Robert W. Reich of the ALPA offered:
What Boeing is attempting to do is very difficult and it remains to
be seen if it will be successful in achieving full, early ETOPS certi-
fication. We at ALPA and others in the industry will continue to
provide input to the process. With early ETOPS as a goal, the 777
399 Id. at 64.
400 Richard G. O'Lone, Service Readiness is Key Objective in Boeing 767-X Develop-
ment, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 20, 1990, at 95.
401 PANDEY, supra note 46, at 66.
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certification process will be more thorough and the 777 will con-
sequently be a far better product for the effort.405
Airbus opposed Boeing's initiative. An industry journal noted
that "Airbus fears that one or two dramas could prejudice press
and public against ETOPS, and that dramas are probable with
[180-minute] diversion times over the North Atlantic and
Pacific." 4 0 6
Despite the oppostion, by 1991, the FAA continued to signal
tacit approval of early ETOPS as a concept. Broderick
explained,
[The] FAA must continue to acknowledge and encourage devel-
opments which have been proven to enhance reliability at an
early stage. . . . We at the FAA are willing to listen. We are willing
to observe and learn from experience. At the same time we also
intend to fulfill our role as regulator.407
By April 1991, the FAA accepted early ETOPS as a "viable con-
cept" and issued draft criteria for Boeing, Pratt & Whitney, and
United Airlines to review.4 0 8 In late 1991, Boeing submitted to
the FAA a three-volume proposal for achieving early approval of
extended twin operations. 0
To achieve early ETOPS, Boeing built the Integrated Aircraft
Systems Lab (IASL) and began testing in late 1992.410 The $370
million aircraft lab was dedicated to delivering a highly reliable
aircraft to the first customers.4 1 ' The newly-appointed FAA Ad-
ministrator, David Hinson, announced that the FAA would
grant the 777 ETOPS authority upon service entry if the 777 and
its engines could clear the FAA's stringent design and test
hurdles."
In May 1993, the FAA formally proposed a set of "special con-
ditions"4 1 3 that would permit the 777 to operate under 180-min-
05 Robert W. Reich, Negative Slant-Setting the Record Straight on Boeing's New
777 Airliner, SEATTLE TIMEs (May 7, 1991), http://community.seattletimes.nw-
source.com/archive/?date=19910507&slug=1281813.
406 J.M. Ramsden, Airbus: Time for Change?, FLIGHT INT'L, Apr. 23, 1988, at 25.
407 PANDEY, supra note 46, at 76.
408 Id. at 77.
409 Richard G. O'Lone, Japan Airlines' 777 Decision Boosts Twinjet Program, Offers
Lift to Lagging Orders, AvIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 4, 1991, at 32.
410 Paul Proctor, New Boeing Test Lab Targets Higher Reliability, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Apr. 11, 1994, at 56.
411 Id.
412 Id.
413 A special condition is a regulation that applies to a particular aircraft
design.
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ute early ETOPS if Boeing could show compliance with those
conditions (instead of with the existing service experience pre-
requisites). " If Boeing was successful, ETOPS type and opera-
tional certification would be granted together."'
The FAA acknowledged that historically, actual revenue ser-
vice experience was necessary to identify problems not uncov-
ered during the normal certification process.4 1 6 But several
recent airplane-engine combinations had demonstrated a high
level of reliability. 417 This reliability was evidenced during basic
certification when few problems occurred.1 ' Based on this, the
FAA considered it feasible that Boeing could deliver a relatively
"mature" product upon entry into revenue service.419
Early ETOPS certification would focus on the airplane's com-
pliance with a process designed to result in reliability.420 The
FAA wanted a level of reliability equal to that found acceptable
through service experience.4 2 ' To measure success, the special
conditions would focus on defining a measurement process as
well as providing a feedback loop to quickly resolve problems. 22
In June 1994, the FAA officially adopted the proposed special
conditions for early ETOPS.4 23 The special conditions consisted
of five main elements. 4 2 4 The first, "design for reliability," re-
quired that the propulsion system 'be designed to ensure that
any failures or malfunctions would not lead to an in-flight en-
gine shutdown. 4 25 This requirement diverged from existing reg-
ulations, which required only that an in-flight shutdown not
jeopardize flight safety.4 26 Thus, preventing in-flight engine
shutdowns was not always a major airplane design objective, but
414 Special Conditions: Extended Range Operation of Boeing Model 777 Series
Airplanes, 58 Fed. Reg. 26,710, 26,710 (May 5, 1993) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pts.
21, 25).
415 Id.
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under "design for reliability," it was.427 The second element, "les-
sons learned," required the 777's design to preempt problems
that had caused in-flight shutdowns or diversions on other air-
planes in the past.4 28 The third element, "test requirements," re-
quired tests to prove that the 7 7 7's design features would
prevent previous problems.429 This validation process included
the 3,000-cycle engine test and 1,000-cycle airplane test.43 0 The
fourth element, "demonstrated reliability," required that the en-
gine and airplane systems maintain a failure rate during the
flight test program and the 1,000-flight cycle that was consistent
with the average failure rate of "presently certified 180-minute
ETOPS airplanes." 3 1 The fifth element, "problem tracking sys-
tem," required any problems occurring during development
and certification that could affect the safety of ETOPS opera-
tions to have proven remedies incorporated into the design
before ETOPS type certification would be awarded.3 2 Addition-
ally, the fifth element required prompt reporting of any
problems occurring after ETOPS operations commenced. 3 3 If
corrective action required a major system redesign, either
ETOPS type design approval would be delayed, or operations
shorter than than 180-minute ETOPS would be granted.43 4
Influencing the FAA's willingness to proceed with the special
conditions was Airbus's experience with the A320, which was the
first completely new twin-engine airplane to be certified since
ETOPS began.13 5 The FAA noted that the A320's CFM56-5 en-
gines had an in-flight shutdown rate of 0.14 per 1,000 engine
hours after four months of service-well in excess of the 0.02
shutdowns required for 180-minute ETOPS.486 It seemed as
though the A320 had not demonstrated acceptable reliability
until it had accumulated a substantial amount (sixteen months)
of service experience."3 ' But a closer inspection uncovered that
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revenue service.4 38 By the time the first in-flight shutdown
dropped out of the 12-month rolling average in-flight shutdown
rate, the shutdown rate fell below the 0.02 standard for 180-min-
ute ETOPS operation and has been stable ever since.4 39 Thus,
the A320 with CFM56-5 engines had in fact achieved high relia-
bility at the time of type certification. 4 4 0 This demonstrated that
maturity at service entry was possible and motivated the FAA to
seriously consider Boeing's proposal, particularly given that the
A320 had achieved high reliability without the five-element cer-
tification program included in the 777 special conditions.4 4 '
Thus, it is ironic that although Airbus tried to persuade the FAA
to reject early ETOPS to protect the A340's sales, it unintention-
ally motivated the FAA to allow early ETOPS.
The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) (Europe's aviation au-
thority), however, took a more measured approach. It approved
a set of strict requirements that, if met, would permit certifica-
tion for 120-minute ETOPS at launch.4 4 2 But 180-minute ETOPS
certification would only come after 20,000 hours for the Pratt
and Rolls Royce engines and after 50,000 hours for the GE90s,
which were not a derivative of an existing engine.443
C. BUILDING A "MATURE" AJRCRAFT FROM INCEPTION
By 1995, Boeing's 777 test program had flown more than
1,600 flights and 3,000 flight hours-roughly double those of
the 757 and 767.* 1 During testing, the 777 performed eight sin-
gle-engine, 180-minute diversions for a total of twenty-four
hours, the equivalent of the total diversion hours accumulated
by the Boeing 767 in its first five years of ETOPS operations.4 4 5
Early ETOPS added nine months onto the certification time; in
total, "the 777 absorbed 120,000 labor hours among FAA offi-
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received FAA type certification and European certification in
nineteen countries. 44 7
On May 24, 1995, the FAA formally approved the operational
side of the early ETOPS program.4 4 8 In a letter dated May 24,
1995, the FAA wrote that Boeing "has successfully complied with
all the requirements of the ETOPS Operational Approval
Plan."44 9 In May, the Pratt & Whitney PW4084 engine was type
certified for 180-minute ETOPS.4 so In June, United Airlines, the
launch customer, began revenue operations for ETOPS
flights."' But, to appease ALPA pilots, United voluntarily re-
stricted its ETOPS operations to 120 minutes for the first few
months.4 5 2 At the 777's ETOPS approval ceremony, Broderick
called the 777 "the finest, most reliable and safest airplane ever
delivered." 5
Nearly eight years after the 777 entered service, a 777 set the
record for the longest passenger diversion when United Airlines
Flight 842 flew for 177 minutes to Kona, Hawaii, on a single en-
gine following an engine shutdown.5 One veteran ETOPS pilot
commenting on the flight explained that the diversion demon-
strated the inherent safety of ETOPS with twin jets:
Would you rather be in a twin-engine B777, with one engine shut
down, 1,100 NM from the nearest suitable ETOPS alternate air-
port, or would you rather be in a four-engine DC-8, with all four
engines running, 1,100 NM from the nearest suitable ETOPS al-
ternate airport, with a cargo compartment fire and no cargo
compartment fire detectors or extinguishers? That's what we
used to do on the Hawaii flights for many, many years. How times
have changed! 55
447 Boeing 777 Type Certified, TRANSPORT CERTIFICATION UPDATE, Summer 1995,
at 4, available at www.faa.gov/aircraft/air cert/ design-approvals/transport/
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D. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF RECENT ETOPS EvOLUTIONS
In 1996, Boeing and Airbus jointly approached regulators to
extend the 180-minute rule.4 5 6 Operation under 180-minute
ETOPS freed operators to fly nearly any route on the globe.'
But weather conditions could render a diversion airport unavail-
able, delaying or preventing flights operating under 180-minute
ETOPS.158 Manufacturers and carriers sought a 15% extension
(similar to the 15% extension granted to the original 120-min-
ute ETOPS) that would increase the time to 207 minutes.459 This
would offer increased flexibility and result in fewer cancellations
when weather affected some on-route diversion airports. 460
To qualify for 207-minute ETOPS, the FAA imposed new re-
quirements beyond the 180-minute level.4 6 ' Planes were re-
quired to have an electrical system to power at least one fuel
boost pump in each main fuel tank, effectively excluding 767s
from operating under the 207-minute rule.4 6 2 The 207-minute
ETOPS policy took effect on March 21, 2000,463 and the 777 re-
ceived type approval for 207-minute ETOPS in April.4 6 4 United
Airlines was the first to receive operational approval in May
2000.465
Early 2007 saw a significant change to ETOPS rules. 4 6 6 The
ETOPS rule of 2007 derived from recommendations from the
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC), a group of
representatives of airlines, transport associations, manufactur-
ers, pilots' associations, and regulators tasked by the FAA to re-
view ETOPS requirements and recommend updates.67 The
2007 rule codifed ETOPS regulations in the Code of Federal
456 PANDEY, supra note 46, at 117.
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Regulations for the first time.4 6 8 ETOPS rules had previously
been administered only through "FAA advisory circulars, policy
letters, and special conditions. "469 The 2007 rule also changed
the definition of ETOPS from "extended-range operations with
two-engine airplanes" to simply "extended operations."47 o
In recognition of the success of ETOPS regulations, the 2007
rule applied ETOPS regulations to passenger planes with more
than two engines for the first time.4 7 1 Three- and four-engine
planes would be limited to routes not exceeding 180 minutes (at
one-engine-inoperative cruise speed) from an airport.4 7 2 These
planes could exceed that limit through ETOPS type and opera-
tion certification.4 7 However, the rule created grandfather pro-
visions for existing and in-production three- and four-engine
planes until February 17, 2015; the rule permanently
grandfathered such planes no longer in production by 2015.11"
And starting in February 2013, three- and four-engine aircraft
diversion time would be limited by their maximum fire suppres-
sion time. 7 5 As of 2003, although all three- and four-engine
planes flying long-range routes had cargo-fire surpression sys-
tems, many would require additional Halon bottles to increase
suppression time and comply with the new rule-many 747s
flew with only 90-minute fire suppression capacity.476
The 2007 rule also established a framework for plane-engine
type certification for operations beyond 180 minutes, up to the
airplane's maximum capability.477 A primary limiting factor
would be fire suppression capability.4 78 Certification beyond 180
minutes would also require greater propulsion reliability and ad-
ditional safety enhancements.47 9 The maximum diversion time
would consider the effects of weather and temperature fore-
468 Id.
469 Chester L. Exstrand et al., The New FAA ETOPS Rule, AERO. Q., Feb. 2007, at
8.
470 Extended Operations (ETOPS) of Multi-Engine Airplanes, 72 Fed. Reg. at
1,809-10.
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casts." Maximum diversion time, however, would be limited by
the needs of the geographic region."" North Atlantic flights
could maintain a maximum diversion time of 180 minutes be-
cause routes in that region do not require longer ETOPS.4 8 2 But
flights between the West Coast of the United States and Austra-
lia and New Zealand could exceed 240 minutes.8
In 2008, Advisory Circular 120-42B provided guidance for ex-
tending maximum ETOPS to 240 minutes.4 8 4 Operating under a
parallel Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand regulation, Air
New Zealand was the first operator to fly 240-minute ETOPS,
flying a 777-300ER from Los Angeles to Auckland.4 85 Although
Air New Zealand could have operated the route under 180-min-
ute ETOPS, 240-minute ETOPS allowed for a slightly more di-
rect path.4 8 6 Captain David Morgan, chief pilot for Air New
Zealand, explained: "Less fuel is burned and less carbon dioxide
is emitted into the atmosphere. It's also good for customers be-
cause flights are potentially shorter and passengers could arrive
sooner at their destinations. "487
In 2011, Airbus stopped production on the A340, having sold
377.488 The same year, Boeing delivered its 1,000th 777 to
Dubai-based Emirates Airline. 48 9 At the time of writing this arti-
cle, Boeing had sold over 1,300 777s and was in the early stages
of designing a derivative 777.490 Airbus continues to manufac-
480 See id. at 1,839, 1,844.
481 See id. at 1,814.
482 See id. at 1,847.
483 See id. at 1,838, 1,849. New Zealand's EDTO rule was enacted in November
2010.
484 FAA, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR 120-42B: EXTENDED OPERA-
TIONS (ETOPS AND POLAR OPERATIONS) 38-39 (2008) [hereinafter ADVISORY CIR-
CULAR 120-42B].
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ture the twin-engine Airbus A330, which has sold over 1,000
copies. 491
VI. WHAT HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUCCESS
OF ETOPS?
In some respects, ETOPS had little to do with the number of
engines on a plane. When ETOPS was proposed in the early
1980s, engine reliability had improved to the extent that the
odds of two engines failing for independent reasons were ex-
tremely small. From that perspective, there was little to be
gained in terms of safety by having three or four engines.
Given this background, the FAA could have simply exempted
twin-engine jet aircraft from the 60-minute rule-similar to what
it did in the mid-1960s when it exempted three-engine jet air-
planes from the 60-minute rule following the development of
the Boeing 727. Moreover, in the 1980s, nations adopting the
ICAO 90-minute rule allowed twin-engine planes, such as the
A300, to operate routes equivalent to what would become 120-
minute ETOPS.4 9 2 And U.S. military and private twin-engine
planes operated exempt from the 60-minute rule without is-
sue. 9" The FAA could have simply relied on this precedent to
change the 60-minute rule to something comparable to the
ICAO 90-minute rule, or to exempt twin-engine planes
altogether.
To the FAA's credit, it did not. Rather, the FAA used the ad-
vent of long-range twins to implement a regulatory regime that
would further enhance safety. As FAA Administrator Lynn
Helms correctly identified, there was a legitimate question of
whether a single engine could power a plane's critical subsys-
tems at the same time it maintained flight.4 9 4 This concern was
particularly applicable to a plane's deicing system. An airplane
operating on a single engine will fly at a lower altitude than one
operating on both engines.9 At the lower altitude, icing (the
buildup of ice on the plane's control surfaces) seriously threat-
ens flight safety. 96 To prevent ice buildup, a plane's ice-protec-
tion system typically bleeds hot engine air onto the control
491 Airbus A330, Bus. AvIATION GRP., http://www.businessaviation.com/air-
craft-guide/airlinersguide/airliners/airbus-a330 (last visited Mar. 12, 2013).
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surfaces.4 9 7 This further taxes the engine, making it more diffi-
cult for the single engine to keep the plane aloft while powering
other critical systems. The FAA demanded solutions before it
would consider twin-engine extended operations.
With the benefit of hindsight, it may seem obvious for the
FAA to demand multiple redundant power sources prior to al-
lowing extended -operations. But this was not required for
planes operating under the 90-minute rule. 98 To Boeing's
credit, when it proposed ETOPS, it pushed for improvements
that would increase safety beyond that offered by three- and
four-engine airplanes. 4 9 9 Boeing not only proposed solutions to
the problem of powering critical sub-systems, but also proposed
additional safety features for long-haul flights. One additional
safety feature was fire suppression capable of suppressing a fire
for the length of the longest possible diversion-a significant
safety enhancement over many three- and four-engine air-
planes. 0 In addition, pilots and other airline organizations pro-
vided a loud and necessary voice, demanding adequate safety
measures before allowing any change in the status quo.
In the end, ETOPS was a rare compromise that left everyone
happy. The FAA satisfied its dual mandate of regulating and
promoting civil aviation. Airlines won the ability to more fully
utilize their jets. Manufacturers won the ability to better market
their twin-engine products. Aviation professionals have enjoyed
improved safety-most pilots finish a career having never exper-
ienced an in-flight shutdown. 01 Passengers have benefited be-
cause ETOPS flights allow more direct flights from smaller
markets; the industry calls this practice "dehubbing."5 12 Finally,
the environment has benefited from airlines' ability to operate
smaller, more fuel-efficient planes.os
Thus, ETOPS's success is largely attributable to an involved
and technically proficient industry regulator. Another large fac-
tor is the involvement of powerful industry players, such as Boe-
ing, that have a vested interest in improving safety. Boeing does
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499 See id. at 30.
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501 See BIBEL, supra note 90, at 208.
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not operate its planes commercially (though long ago, Boeing,
United Airlines, and Pratt & Whitney were the same com-
pany),"o' but its business model depends on airlines' safe opera-
tion of planes. If airlines operate unsafely, passenger traffic will
drop, putting Boeing's customers out of business. Indeed, the
McDonnell Douglas DC-10's reputation was severely damaged
following a crash in 1979.505 That incident involved Flight 191, a
DC-10 with 271 passengers and crew that departed from Chi-
cago O'Hare.5 0 A series of incidents occurred, starting with the
No. 1 engine and pylon separating from the wing during take-
off.5 07 The loss of the engine led to an uncommanded slats re-
traction on the left wing, rolling the aircraft into an
unrecoverable dive and killing all occupants and two on the
ground.50 8 The Chicago Tribune published a photo of the in-
verted DC-10 missing an engine on the front page.5 09
Thus, Boeing depends on the safe operation of its products
more so than Ford, Toyota, or General Motors. Accordingly,
even though Boeing had an interest in removing the 60-minute
rule to better market its next-generation twin-engine airplanes,
it had an even greater interest in ensuring that extended opera-
tions would not jeopardize safety. This self-interest has contrib-
uted to ETOPS's stellar safety record.
Early ETOPS has been similarly successful. It avoids the prob-
lem of developing a multi-billion dollar long-range twin. only to
wait for several years before airlines can fully utilize it. Early
ETOPS provoked predictable opposition. A headline on the
topic stated, "Boeing Co. Pushing the 'Envelope'-Could Early
Etops Erode 777's Margin of Safety?"510 But early ETOPS suc-
ceeded largely because it was a logical extension of ETOPS con-
cepts; rather than using in-service experience to validate the
504 See The Boeing Logbook: 1927-1932, BOEING, www.boeing.com/boeing/
history/chronology/chronO3.page (last visited June 25, 2013).
505 John Curley, McDonnell-Douglas Must Decide Soon Whether to Stop Producing
DC-10Jets, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1985, at 12; BIBEL, supra note 90, at 24-25 ("The
Chicago crash and the subsequent grounding of DC-10s directly relate to the
cancellation of new orders for the DC-10, the end of its production in 1989, and
the eventual takeover of McDonnell Douglas by Boeing in 1997.").




509 See NEWSROOM HisTORY, www.newsroomhistory.com/wp-content/gallery/
test-gallery_1/00189-srl2agqgpjw50189jpg (last visited June 26, 2013).
510 Acohido, supra note 402.
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maturity of engines and other critical components, Boeing and
engine manufacturers could simulate that experience using les-
sons learned from previous products. Because new engines had
entered service many times before, Boeing and the engine man-
ufacturers could be confident that pre-service validation tests
would accurately reproduce in-service experience. In the end,
the 777's safety record bears this out. Again, early ETOPS's suc-
cess is attributable to an open-minded, but demanding, industry
regulator and to manufacturers with a vested interest in ensur-
ing the safety of their products. Indeed, had the 777 been per-
ceived as unsafe in the slightest, airlines had two alternative
aircraft to choose from.
VII. THE GROUNDING OF THE BOEING
787 DREAMLINER
A. THE BOEING 787 DREAMLINER
In early 2003, Boeing began developing a more efficient twin-
engine aircraft, the 7E7.51 Boeing later renamed it the 787-
the number eight is considered lucky in Chinese culture.1 2 The
787 entered service in September 2011-nearly three years be-
hind schedule-with launch customer All Nippon Airways.'"
A year after Boeing announced the 787, Airbus announced its
own next-generation twin: the A350. 514 At the time of writing,
the A350, dubbed the A350-XWB ("extra-wide-body," to differ-
entiate it from the A330), has had its first flight, but it is still in
development.515
Both the 787 and A350 were designed to fly ETOPS routes. In
2011, the FAA granted 330-minute ETOPS type-design certifica-
511 J. Lynn Lunsford, Navigating Change: Boeing, Losing Ground to Airbus, Faces
Key Choice-Amid Downturn, Firm Ponders Spending on Innovation or Diversifying De-
fensively-Debate over All-New Plane, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2003, at Al.
512 Lucky 8 Pays 60 in Boeing Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2005), http://www.ny-
times.com/2005/01/29/business/worldbusiness/29boeing.html.
513 Christopher Drew, Boeing Posts Strong Profit but Cuts Delivery Forecast, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/27/business/boeing-
posts-strong-profit-but-cuts-delivery-forecast.html.
514 Andrea Rothman & Mary Jane Credeur, United Said to Study Biggest Airbus
A350 to Replace 747s, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-10-31/united-said-to-study-biggest-airbus-a350-to-replace-boeing-747s.
html.
515 Airbus Unveils Jet and Broadens Rivalry with Boeing, N.Y. TIMES (June 14,
2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/06/15/business/global/airbuss-latest-jetliner-
takes-its-first-flight.html; Airbus Delays A350 XWB Entry as EADS Profits Triple, BBC
NEWS (July 27, 2012), www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19010202.
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tion to both 787 engine options, the General Electric GEnx-1B
engine and the Rolls-Royce Trent 1000.51m The 787, however, en-
tered service with only 180-minute certification; 330-minute cer-
tification was delayed due to a new regulatory requirement that
additional low-fuel-alerting messages be incorporated to con-
sider abnormal fuel contingencies. " This likely caused United
Airlines to cancel its planned 787 service from Houston to New
Zealand.' 8
The 787 was designed for efficiency. To save weight, it was the
first commercial passenger jet to be built primarily of carbon
fiber composites, a lighter and stronger alternative to alumi-
num.5 " But most of the increased fuel efficiency derived from
the 787's next-generation engines; customers could choose ei-
ther General Electric GEnx or Rolls Royce Trent 1000 engines.
Further improving efficiency, the 787 used more electricity for
critical systems in lieu of pneumatic (air pressure bled from the
engines) or hydraulic power. 2 0 This additional energy use re-
quired a larger capacity battery for backup and ground
power."' To avoid the weight penalty of a larger, traditional
nickel-cadmium (Ni-Cad) or lead-acid battery (a Ni-Cad battery
would have added 200 pounds to the plane), the 787 was the
first Boeing jet to use a lithium-ion battery.2
516 GEnx-1B Engine Receives U.S. FAA 330-Minute ETOPS Approval, GE AVIATION,
www.geaviation.com/press/genx/genx-20111201.html (last visited July 11,
2013); Rolls-Royce Trent 1000 Awarded ETOPS Approval, ROLLS-ROYCE (May 9,
2011), www.rolls-royce.com/news/pressreleases/2011/110509 trent_1000
etops.approvaljsp.
517 Guy Norris, Back on Track, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 10, 2012, at
52.
518 See Jon Ostrower, Boeing Nears 787 GEnx and 330 min ETOPS Certification,
FLIGHTGLOBAL (Mar. 13, 2012), www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/boeing-
nears-787-genx-and-330min-etops-certification-369474; Michael Field, Air NZ's
Dreamliner Plans Hit Turbulence, STUFF.CO.Nz (Apr. 19, 2013, 5:00 AM), www.stuff.
co.nz/business/industries/8569548/Air-NZs-Drealiner-plans-hit-turbulence.
519 Jason Paur, How a Batter Grounded Boeing's Revolutionary Dreamliner, WIRED
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B. THE GROUNDING OF ALL 787s
On January 7, 2013, a Japan Airlines 787 landed at Boston's
Logan International Airport from Narita, Japan.2 As the 787
taxied to the gate, the crew started the auxiliary power unit
(APU) .524 Arriving at the gate, the passengers and crew de-
planed, and cleaning and maintenance crew boarded.5 2 5 The
maintenance crew noticed "an electrical burning smell and
smoke in the aft cabin" followed by a power loss to systems pow-
ered by the APU.5 2 6 A mechanic went to the cockpit and saw the
APU had shut down.5 2 7 He then went to check the aft electronic
equipment bay, which holds the battery used to start the APU."
He opened the bay to see smoke and flames coming from the
front of the battery case.5 2 ' He tried unsuccessfully to extinguish
the fire with a dry chemical extinguisher.so Other crew mem-
bers saw "intense" smoke in the cabin. 5 3
Airport firefighters soon responded." They applied Halotro
(a fire-extinguishing agent) to the battery several times-at this
point the smoke was so heavy the fire could only be seen by
infrared camera. 3 Smoke could soon be seen outside the air-
plane as well. 5 34 At one point, the battery hissed loudly and liq-
uid flowed down the side of the case; a "pop" sound followed. 3 5
A firefighter suffered a burn on his neck when the battery, as
he described it, "exploded."5 3 1 One hour and forty minutes after
being notified of the fire, the firefighters "controlled" the fire.
Controlling the fire involved removing the battery from the
plane-a task made difficult because the quick disconnect knob
had "charred and melted.""53
523 Boeing 787 Suffers a Battery Fire in Boston, supra note 47.
524 NAT'L TRANSP. SAFEY- BD., CASE No. DCA131AO37, INTERIM FACTUAL RE-
PORT 1 (2013), available at www.ntsb.gov/investigations/2013/boeing_787/in-
terimreport B787-3-7-13.pdf.
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The fire damaged an area roughly fifty centimeters from the
battery.53 ' An NTSB investigation determined that one of the
eight individual lithium-ion battery cells short circuited, leading
to a thermal runaway that cascaded to other battery cells. 54 0
"[T]he temperature inside the battery case exceeded 500 de-
grees Fahrenheit."5 4 1 Boeing had delivered the 787 to Japan Air-
lines on December 20, 2012, eighteen days before the
incident.54 2 The 787 had completed twenty-two flights and 169
flight hours.4 3 The battery that caught fire was installed on Oc-
tober 15, 2012.6" Two days before the fire, the battery had been
disconnected while an electrical panel was inspected.5 4 5 "The
battery was reconnected the next day."5 4 1 Japan Airlines re-
ported that it had experienced "'several cases' in which mainte-
nance crew members needed to replace 787 batteries after
irregularities," but added that the replacements were "con-
ducted 'within the scope of regular maintenance.' ""4
Nine days after the Boston fire, an All Nippon Airways 787
with 129 passengers departed Ube, Japan, bound for Tokyo.4
An in-flight alarm in the cockpit warned that the main battery
was overheating; this was followed by a burning smell in the
cabin. 5 4 9 The 787 diverted to Takamatsu, and passengers evacu-
ated the plane using emergency slides. 5 o Prior to takeoff, the
-53 JAL 787 Battery Fire Fails to Unsettle Faith in Lithium-Ion, FLIGHT INT'L, Jan. 15,
2013, at 1.
540 NTSB Identifies Origin ofjAL Boeing 787 Battery Fire; Design, Certification and
Manufacturing Processes Come Under Scrutiny, NTSB (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.
ntsb.gov/news/2013/130207.html.
54 Id.
542 NTSB Issues Seventh Update on JAL Boeing 787 Battery Fire Investigation, NTSB
(Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.ntsb.gov/news/2013/130201b.html.
543 Matthew L. Wald, No Defect is Found in Another 787 Battery, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/28/business/backup-battery-in-
787-had-no-obvious-anomalies-report-says.html.
544 NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY 1D., CASE No. DCA131AO37, supra note 524, at 5.
545 See id.
546 Id.
54 Christopher Drew et al., Boeing 787 Battery Was a Concern Before Failure, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/30/business/boeing-
aware-of-battery-ills-before-the-fires.html.
548 Yoree Koh et al., Another 787 in Emergency Landing, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16,
2013, at B1.
54 Jon Ostrower et al., All Boeing Dreamliners are Grounded World-Wide, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 17, 2013, at Al.
550 Hiroko Tabuchi & Jad Mouawad, Top Airlines in Japan Grounding Boeing
787s, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/16/busi-
ness/emergency-landing-for-boeing-787.html.
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plane's computers indicated a battery fault, but the warning was
displayed in a part of the cockpit's data system that pilots do not
routinely scan immediately before takeoff.5 ' The battery exper-
ienced an unexpectedly low charge.15 2 "Subsequent examina-
tion of the main battery, located in the aircraft's forward
electronic equipment bay, revealed it was 'discoloured and the
electrolysis solution had leaked.' "6655 The Japan Transport Safety
Board (Board) investigators found ten holes in the battery case
that were caused by sparks-the steel "battery case melts at
around 1,400 degrees."65 5 The Board also found that the 787's
aft APU battery showed signs of failure.55 5 Tomography scans
revealed that two cells in the aft APU battery were slightly swol-
len.5 6 The 787 had received a new battery approximately two
months before the failure.5 In fact, in the months before the
fire, All Nippon Airways (the largest operator of the 787) had
replaced ten batteries. 558 In five of the replacements, the main
battery "showed an unexpectedly low charge."59
Following the All Nippon diversion in Japan, all fifty 787s in
service with eight different carriers were grounded by global
regulators, including the FAA. 6 0 The battery incident followed a
series of smaller incidents, including a December 2012 diversion
of a United Airlines 787 following an electrical incident.5 6' A
fuel leak and windshield crack also plagued early customer
flights. 6 2 And during testing in November 2010, a 787 test flight
suffered a serious in-flight electrical fire. 66
551 Ostrower et al., supra note 549, at Al.
552 Drew et al., Boeing 787 Battery, supra note 547.
55 Mavis Toh & Stephen Trimble, Boeing Faces Multiple Safety Investigations as
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C. RETURNING THE 787 TO SERVICE
Three months later, on April 27, 2013, Ethiopian Airlines
Flight 801 departed from Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa bound
for Nairobi, Kenya.56 Flight 801 was the first 787 to return to
service.'"6 By May 2013, four other 787 operators had returned
their dreamliners to service, though the cause of the previous
battery failures had still not been discovered. 66
To ensure safe operation of the batteries and resume 787
flights, Boeing developed a new battery design and enclosure.6 7
The new battery includes "improved separation of the individual
lithium-ion cells to minimize the chance of ... thermal propaga-
tion" should one of the eight cells overheat.56 8 The battery is
now encased in a one-eighth-inch thick steel box that has a vent
to the aircraft exterior.56 9 The enclosure is "designed to elimi-
nate oxygen," starving any fire. 7 0 The battery charging system
was also redesigned to reduce the maximum charge allowed,
and increase the minimum charge allowed.
D. THE FAA's 2007 APPROACH TO LITHIUM-ION BATTERIES
The use of lithium-ion batteries on aircraft is a novel technol-
ogy. Accordingly, on October 11, 2007, the FAA published, in
the Federal Register, a final, special condition approving Boe-
ing's inclusion of lithium-ion batteries in the 787.7 The special
condition noted that the 787 would incorporate a number of
novel design features including "[1]arge, high capacity,
rechargeable" lithium-ion batteries.573 Lithium-ion batteries
have failure, operational, and maintenance characteristics that
564 SeeJon Ostrower & Hiroyuki Kachi, Boeing's Dreamliner Returns to Commercial
Service, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Apr. 28, 2013.
565 Id.
566 SeeJon Ostrower, United Puts Dreamliner Back in Service, WALL Sr. J. ONLINE,
May 20, 2013.
567 See Jason Paur, Boeing Completes Final 787 Battery Text, Awaits FAA Approval,
WIRED (Apr. 8, 2013), http://wvw.wired.com/autopia/2013/04/boeing-787-fi-
nal-battery-flight-test.
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differ significantly from the Ni-Cad and lead-acid rechargeable
batteries that were approved for large airplanes.17' Ni-Cad bat-
teries had sparked battery fires and failures, leading the FAA to
promulgate rules in 1977 and 1978 governing Ni-Cad installa-
tions on large transport airplanes.175 The FAA acknowledged the
limited experience with rechargeable lithium-ion batteries in
aviation. 76 But other users of lithium-ion technology, including
cell phones and electric vehicles, have uncovered safety
problems with lithium-ion batteries including "overcharging,
over-discharging, and flammability of cell components." 77
Compared to Ni-Cad and lead-acid batteries, lithium-ion bat-
teries are significantly more susceptible to internal failures that
can result in self-sustaining temperature and pressure increases
(i.e., thermal runaway). 7 Overcharging, in particular, can
cause heating and destabilization of the components of the
cell. 57 9 "The metallic lithium can ignite, resulting in a self-sus-
taining fire or explosion."58 o And the severity of thermal run-
away "increases with increasing battery capacity, because of the
higher amount of electrolytes in large batteries."581 Discharge of
some lithium-ion batteries over a certain voltage can corrode
cell electrodes, causing irreversible loss of battery capacity.58 2
This capacity loss "may not be detected by the simple voltage
measurements commonly available to flightcrews.""5 This issue
is also present in Ni-Cad batteries. 58 4 But unlike Ni-Cad and
lead-acid batteries, some lithium-ion batteries use liquid-flamma-
ble electrolytes, which "can serve as a source of fuel for an exter-
nal fire [ ] if there is a breach of the battery container. "585
The FAA conditioned the use of lithium-ion batteries by re-
quiring that (1) all characteristics of the lithium-ion battery and
its installation that could affect safe operation of the 787 be ad-
dressed, and (2) appropriate maintenance requirements be es-
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batteries when needed.5 8 6 It specifically applied 14 C.F.R.
§ 25.1353, regulating electrical equipment and installation, and
14 C.F.R. § 25.863, regulating flammable fluid fire protection to
lithium-ion batteries. 587 Applying 14 C.F.R. § 25.863 was neces-
sary because the electrolytes used in lithium-ion batteries are
flammable, while those in lead-acid and Ni-Cad batteries are
not.5 8 The FAA also imposed new requirements to address the
hazards of overcharging and over-discharging that are unique to
lithium-ion batteries and to ensure that batteries used as spares
are maintained in an appropriate state of charge. 8 The FAA
noted that these changes were similar to those adopted for the
Airbus A380, which also utilized lithium-ion batteries-though
to a lesser extent.590
In response to the proposed special conditions, the ALPA re-
quested modifications to the conditions.5 9 1 The ALPA attached
to its comments a 2003 FAA publication, "Flammability Assess-
ment of Bulk-Packed, Rechargeable Lithium-Ion Cells in Trans-
port Category Aircraft."59 2 The report's executive summary
noted the following:
A relatively small fire source is sufficient to heat the lithium-ion
cell above the temperature required to activate the pressure re-
lease mechanism in the cell. This causes the cell to forcefully
vent its electrolyte through the relief ports near the positive ter-
minal. The electrolyte is highly flammable and easily ignites
when exposed to an open flame or hot surface."
The ALPA requested several modifications to the conditions to
ensure no explosive or toxic gases emitted by a lithium-ion bat-
tery would enter the cabin, that fires could be extinguished by
the crew, and that the batteries would not overheat or over-
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sponse, reasoning that the proposed conditions would address
the ALPA's concerns.5 9 5
In 2006, a 787 prototype battery exploded in a lab; despite
firefighters' efforts, the explosion resulted in the destruction of
a 10,000 square-foot Arizona building." In 2010, three years af-
ter the special conditions were finalized, a UPS Boeing 747
crashed in Dubai, killing both pilots, when its shipment of
81,000 lithium-ion batteries burst into flames.1 7 At the time of
writing this article, the ICAO dangerous goods committee had
proposed revoking an exemption that permitted lithium-ion air-
craft batteries weighing up to seventy-seven pounds to be
shipped on passenger planes. 9" Industry groups argued that it
was inconsistent to ground the 787 because of its batteries but
allow the same batteries to fly as cargo on passenger planes."
E. THE 787 DEMONSTRATES THE NEED TO APPLY ETOPS
PRINCIPLES TO NOVEL AVIATION TECHNOLOGY
ETOPS depends on several concepts. First, engines mature
over time, and engines that derive from existing designs enter
service as a mature product, experiencing few issues. Second, by
monitoring and resolving problems that lead to shutdowns, reli-
ability increases. Third, by anticipating risks and taking ade-
quate precautions, safety improves. Mandating sufficient cargo
hold fire suppression capabilities for the length of a diversion is
a notable example.
But lithium-ion batteries, along with the FAA's initial attempt
to regulate them, fall outside the scope of the larger ETOPS
concept. Lithium-ion batteries do not derive from proven and
reliable aviation technology. Though they experience extensive
use in consumer electronics, the consumer electronics field
59 Id.
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does not require the level of maturity and reliability that the
commercial aviation industry requires. Thus, unlike a new en-
gine derived from a proven engine, a current generation lith-
ium-ion battery is unlikely to enter the market as a mature
product.
Aviation lithium-ion batteries may be better analogized to a
first-generation 767: promising, but not a proven mature tech-
nology. Accordingly, a conservative approach would require
that, like the 767, lithium-ion batteries demonstrate maturity
before they are used in a capacity where a failure could threaten
a flight. This maturity should be shown through the accumula-
tion of a sufficient number of flight hours and by meeting a tar-
get level of reliability. Ideally, such in-flight experience would
be obtained through something analogous to non-ETOPS flight.
Indeed, it is extremely fortunate that one 787 battery failure oc-
curred on the ground, while the other occurred during a do-
mestic flight-neither occurred three hours from an airport.
And even though the 777 established precedent for delivering
a mature product upon entry into service, the adoption of lith-
ium-ion batteries is not analogous. With the 777, there was con-
siderable institutional knowledge and experience with how
engines mature. Thus, there was a high degree of confidence
that Boeing could simulate the in-service maturing process prior
to actual entry into service. With lithium-ion batteries, there is
less knowledge about how the technology matures. The industry
does not even know-and may never know-how the two 787
batteries failed.oo
That is not to say that all novel technology requires such a
conservative approach to adoption. Indeed, clean-sheet aircraft
are expected to incorporate numerous novel design features.
The 787, for instance, included significantly more carbon fiber
than previous airplanes, and the 777 was the first Boeing jet to
incorporate fly-by-wire technology.60 ' Incorporating new tech-
nologies such as these should not necessarily require demon-
600 Kristen Painter, NTSB's Two-Day Boeing 787 Battery Fire Investigation,
DENVERPOST.COM (Apr. 24, 2013, 11:30 AM), http://blogs.denverpost.com/
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ium ELT Safety Review, FLIGHTGLOBAL (July 18, 2013), http://www.flightglobal.
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strated maturity through in-service experience because these
technologies either have fewer dangers in other contexts or
their dangers are better understood. Prior to their adoption by
the civil aviation industry, carbon fiber and fly-by-wire technol-
ogy were used extensively in military aviation. But the dangers of
lithium-ion batteries are well-documented, and the industry's
ability to fail-safe the technology is less developed.
In all likelihood, the new battery fix will ensure safe flight dur-
ing all portions of a flight. A cell is highly unlikely to fail, over-
heat, propagate to other cells, fail to vent, and breach the new
steel container. But the adoption of the lithium-ion battery did
not see the same conservative approach followed during the
adoption of ETOPS and its evolutions. Perhaps the lesson for
the next adotpion of new technology is to embrace the conserva-
tive approach that was so successfully applied to the creation of
ETOPS. Indeed, the industry may already be learning from this
lesson. Following the 787 grounding, Airbus chose to switch to
Ni-Cad batteries for the A350.6 0 2 Airbus added that it will em-
bark on "additional maturity studies."o13
VIII. CONCLUSION
OnJune 16, 2011, Flight 277, a four-engine Delta Airlines 747-
400 with 359 passengers and 19 crewmembers, departed Hono-
lulu bound for Osaka.6 04 En route, over the Pacific, a serious
crack formed in the windshield.c0 To reduce the risk of the
windshield shattering, the pilots reduced altitude, changed
course, and flew for nearly an hour toward a small World War II
airstrip: Henderson Field on the Midway Atoll.o 6
While landing, the 747 struck two albatrosses flying near the
runway, damaging a wing flap.6 0 7 Passengers remained aboard
until a second 747 arrived from Japan, delivering parts and
602 David Kaminski-Morrow, Airbus to Ditch Lithium-Ion Batteries on A350, FLIGHT-
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43e52c40.
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mechanics."os Passengers changed planes that night and de-
parted for Osaka at 5 a.m. (nearly twelve hours later) .6o' The
occupants of Flight 277, a four-engine, ETOPS-exempt 747, had
benefited from ETOPS when an emergency occurred over the
Pacific. Henderson Field on Midway is kept in operation specifi-
cally for ETOPS.1 o
In 1989, the Midway naval base closed, and the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service took over the base.6 1 Phoenix Air, a private
company, contracted with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to
reopen the airport, intent on expanding Midway as a tourist des-
tination." When the operation became unprofitable, once
again threatening closure of the airport, Boeing subsidized
Phoenix Air for nearly five years. 13 For Boeing, Midway served
as a crucial diversion point for ETOPS flights in the Pacific.'1 4
Keeping it open ensured the viability of the 777 in the Pacific.1
In fact, in January 2004, a Continental 777-200ER diverted to
Midway following an engine problem." 6
For the passengers of Flight 277, a non-ETOPS flight, ETOPS
very quietly saved the day. And that is the ultimate legacy of
ETOPS: very quietly improving safety. Perhaps the most interest-
ing aspect of ETOPS is that it has been so successful, while at the
same time, so controversial.
Indeed, ETOPS has often been on the receiving end of
kneejerk responses. Boeing's original proposal that twins fly
routes restricted to three- and four-engine planes met nearly
universal opposition. Opponents quipped, "The only reason I fly
in a four-engined plane . . . is because there are none with
five."61 Opposition to ETOPS even found its way into popular
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culture. Tom Clancy's 1999 thriller Rainbow Six begins: 'John
Clark had more time in airplanes than most licensed pilots, and
he knew the statistics as well as any of them, but he still didn't
like the idea of crossing the ocean on a twin-engine airliner.
Four was the right number of engines ... ."
But the data did not support the kneejerk response. Modern
jet engines fail so infrequently (particularly during the cruise
portion of the flight) that the redundancy provided by three-
and four-engine planes is insignificant. Boeing showed that the
well-taken argument against ETOPS-that a plane's critical sub-
systems could not be powered by a single engine-could be
solved by sufficient redundant power sources. Regulators, manu-
facturers, and carriers collectively proved that ETOPS was not
only safe, but also potentially safer than the status quo.
When carriers and manufacturers proposed 180-minute
ETOPS, the same arguments were raised. But again, the data did
not support the opposition. Rather, the data supported a
counterintuitive conclusion: 180-minute ETOPS could be safer
than 120-minute ETOPS because it allowed pilots more discre-
tion in plotting routes and increased the number of suitable
landing sites in the event of an emergency. Three-hour ETOPS
also required significantly greater engine reliability.
Early ETOPS gained similar vocal opposition. Yet the 777's
safety record demonstrated that manufacturers (under the
watchful eye of regulators) could develop a mature product
upon service entry.
The success of ETOPS is attributable to several factors: a
strong and engaged regulatory entity, the FAA, industry players
with a vested interest in improving safety and reliability, and the
technical wherewithal to accomplish ETOPS. ETOPS has had an
enviable success record, but the 787 has, in some respects,
brought this record into question. With respect to the 787's bat-
tery issues (though the precise reason for the failure remains
unknown), the industry would do well to re-embrace the princi-
ples that have made ETOPS a success.
Most analysts believe that the grounding of the Boeing 787
will simply be a rocky beginning for an ultimately successful air-
craft. The author agrees that the problems will ultimately be re-
solved, but if the 787 is indeed a success in the long term, it will
have ETOPS to thank.
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